GRASPING AT STRAWS:
EXPLORING PDVSA’S ACCESS TO DEBTOR
RELIEF UNDER RESTRUCTURING REGIMES1
Lucas Jullian
ABSTRACT
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil company
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is undergoing significant financial
distress. As evidenced by the heavily discounted prices of its publicly traded
bonds, there is speculation concerning PDVSA’s ability to service its debts.
While public debate has focused on the probability and implications of a
default, little has been written about PDVSA’s possible use of debtor relief
in order to restructure its liabilities. Thus, this paper seeks to explore the
forms of debtor relief PDVSA may seek to avail itself of, and whether
PDVSA may be eligible of such relief under the pertinent restructuring
regimes. After assessing PDVSA’s assets, operations, liabilities, and legal
form, this paper explains that all strategies considered would be fraught with
considerable legal and practical challenges. Even if not insurmountable,
such obstacles could provoke highly contentious, litigious proceedings. The
paper is meant to be accessible to readers who have neither specialized in
international bankruptcy, nor in PDVSA’s bonds or current circumstances.
Therefore, specialists in either field may find this Paper overly descriptive
or covering familiar ground.

1. This Paper was developed as an assignment for the seminar LAW 916: Adv. Issues
in Priv. Fin. & Corp. & Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Fall 2016-Spring 2017) at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author, a member of the 2017 class of the MBA
program at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, was enrolled as a non-law
student.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2017, President Nicolás Maduro of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela announced that Venezuela would seek to renegotiate
its external debt — including that of its state-owned oil company, Petróleos
de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA).2 For a statement with such crucial
repercussions for Venezuela’s and PDVSA’s creditors, it was unfortunately
anything but clear: President Maduro seemed to interchangeably use the
terms “refinancing,” “restructuring,” and “reformatting” of debt, and
confusingly added that Venezuela would nonetheless continue to “satisfy
[its] international obligations.”3
The events that have transpired since President Maduro’s statements
have not provided clarification, and they are increasingly ominous in nature.
While PDVSA maintains it has initiated the transfer of interest payments due
since the President’s announcement,4 a lack of evidence of payment has led
S&P to downgrade PDVSA to “selective default,” while Moody’s has
downgraded PDVSA to “technical default.”5 Although debt investors have
so far refrained from initiating legal actions against PDVSA due to late
payments, capital market participants seem to share Moody’s expectations
that PDVSA will continue to “miss or default on further payments”6: as of
March 6, 2018, PDVSA’s unsecured bonds were priced between 20.8 and
30.4 cents on the dollar.7 For those unfamiliar with bond pricing, such
heavily discounted prices are reflective of a significantly distressed firm,
which “generally implies, if not invariably results in, some type of . . .
restructuring . . . or a sale of assets and subsequent liquidation.”8
2. Katia Porzecanski, Patricia Laya, Ben Bartenstein, and Christine Jenkins Tanzi,
Venezuela Will Seek to Restructure Debt, Blaming Sanctions, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2017,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-02/venezuela-will-seek-to-restructuredebt-as-sanctions-take-hold.
3. Bret Rosen, Venezuela’s Default: What is Maduro Thinking?, AMERICAS
QUARTERLY, Nov. 5, 2017, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/venezuelas-defaultwhat-maduro-thinking.
4. PDVSA
(@PDVSA),
TWITTER
(Dec.
14,
2017,
8:18
PM),
https://twitter.com/PDVSA/status/941477507072741376.
5. Ben Bartenstein, Venezuela Is Late on $1.7 Billion and Bond Traders are Stuck,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 15, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0215/venezuela-is-late-on-1-7-billion-and-bond-traders-are-stuck.
6. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Issuer Comment, GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA:
EMTA RECOMMENDATION POINTS TO FURTHER EVENTS OF MISSED PAYMENTS 1 ’(Jan. 22,
2018).
7. See Appendix 2: PDVSA & Venezuela Bond Pricing (illustrating in two graphs the
bond pricing of PDVSA and Venezuela bond pricing from October, 6, 2015 to March 6,
2018).
8. STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR SPECULATIVE
INVESTORS 7 (2005). This is not to be taken as a rule, but rather as a general observation made
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The saga of PDVSA’s potential inability — or unwillingness — to
satisfy its financial obligations has fueled active debates amongst observers
on the prospect and implications of such an event. This issue is often
incorporated into the broader discussion involving PDVSA’s sole
shareholder—the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela)—which
finds itself under commensurate economic and financial duress.9 Their dire
predicaments have raised questions such as: will PDVSA or Venezuela
default? Should they default? If they were to default—whether by choice
or circumstance—when would that occur? Given PDVSA’s status as a stateowned enterprise (SOE), what would their defaults imply for their own and
each other’s creditors? In case of default, what could they do to protect
themselves from creditors?10
by Moyer on situations in which “all or some portion of unsecured debt [is] trading at a market
discount of more than 40%.”
9. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the current economic and financial
situation of Venezuela. For the purposes of this point, it should suffice to note that Moody’s
has given Venezuela a C rating, worse than PDVSA’s Ca rating (see Appendix 1: PDVSA &
Venezuela Long Term Rating History), and that Venezuela’s unsecured bond prices also
reflect distress and investors’ significant doubts on their full repayment; (see Appendix 2:
PDVSA & Venezuela Bond Pricing). For a broader overview of Venezuela’s current
economic condition see Zeeshan Aleem, Venezuela’s Economic Crisis Is So Dire That Most
People Have Lost an Average of 19 Pounds, VOX (Feb. 22, 2017),
http://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/22/14688194/venezuela-crisis-study-food-shortage;
William Finnegan, Letter From Venezuela: Venezuela, A Failing State, THE NEW YORKER
(Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/venezuela-a-failingstate; Rick Gladstone, How Venezuela Fell Into Crisis, and What Could Happen Next, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/americas/venezuelacrisis-what-next.html?_r=0; Rosamond Hutt, Venezuela’s Economic Crisis: All You Need to
Know
in
4
Charts,
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(June
15,
2016)
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/venezuela-economic-crisis-in-4-charts/;
Ray
Sanchez, Venezuela: How Paradise Got Lost, CNN (Apr. 21, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/21/americas/venezuela-crisis-explained/; Jonathan Wheatley,
Andres Schipani, and Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela: A Nation in Bondage, FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Nov.
10,2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/55ebfe26-a665-11e6-8b6902899e8bd9d1;’;’; Venezuela: A Nation in a State, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-political-and-economicguide-venezuela;
Venezuela,
THE
ECONOMIST:
INTELLIGENCE
UNIT,
http://country.eiu.com/venezuela# (last visited Apr. 29, 2017); Venezuela: Overview, THE
WORLD BANK, , http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/venezuela/overview#1 (last visited
Apr. 28, 2017) (examining Venezuela’s current economic crisis and conditions).
10. Perhaps the most illustrative exchange debating these issues has been that between
Venezuelan economists Ricardo Hausmann and Francisco Rodríguez. Mr. Hausmann is
Director of Harvard’s Center for International Development and Professor of the Practice of
Economic Development at the Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Rodríguez is Chief
Economist at Torino Capital, and previously Chief Andean Economist at Bank of America
Merryl Lynch. Since 2014, these former co-editors and co-authors have held one of the most
longstanding and most publicized debates on the issue of Venezuela’s and PDVSA’s potential
defaults. See VENEZUELA BEFORE CHAVEZ: ANATOMY OF AN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE (Ricardo
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When a working version of this paper had been drafted (June 25, 2017)
and made publicly available (July 24, 2017), there had been a notable
absence of published discourse or research on PDVSA’s possible
restructuring options outside of default or highly contentious legal
maneuvers.11 Since then, a number of articles and white papers have tackled
Hausman and Francisco Rodriguez eds., 2014); Ricardo Hausmann, Francisco Rodriguez, and
Rodrigo Wagner, Growth Collapse, (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Working Paper
No.136, (Oct. 2006), https://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/hausmann_growth.pdf
Andrew Rosati, These Harvard Economists Offer Differing Views for How to Save Venezuela,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/asvenezuelan-expats-see-end-a-harvard-wall-street-feud-emerges
(demonstrating
the
collaboration of Hausmann and Rodriquez). In order to view the evolution of this exchange,
see Ricardo Hausmann, It Could Be Too Late to Avoid Catastrophe in Venezuela, FINANCIAL
TIMES,
Feb.
3,
2016,
https://www.ft.com/content/204fc996-c8d5-11e5-a8efea66e967dd44#axzz3zA5qBhSc; Ricardo Hausmann and Miguel Angel Santos, Should
Venezuela Default, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/ricardo-hausmann-and-miguel-angel-santos-pillory-the-madurogovernment-for-defaulting-on-30-million-citizens—but-not-on-wallstreet?barrier=accessreg; Ricardo Hausmann and Mark Walker, Restructuring Debt in the
SYNDICATE
(Oct.
6,
2016),
https://www.projectDark,
PROJECT
syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-perils-for-venezuela-by-ricardo-hausmannand-mark-walker-2-2016-10; Francisco Rodríguez, Why Venezuela Should Not Default,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/6e350887-8b55-3150-9eb2b17ae10fa6b0;“”; Francisco Rodríguez, Venezuela Has Good Reasons to Avoid Default,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 11, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-0811/venezuela-has-good-reasons-to-avoid-default; Post-Chavez Venezuela: A Roadmap for
Reconstruction, BROOKINGS (October 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/events/postchavez-venezuela-a-roadmap-for-reconstruction Venezuelan Caucus at HKS, What does the
future
hold
for
Venezuela?,
YOUTUBE
(March
20,2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vz9sg3HBeOs (discussing the impact of bond default on
Venezuela’s economic condition).
For discussions on other issues raised by Venezuela’s and PDVSA’s predicaments, see PAOLO
COLLA, ANNA GELPERN, AND G. MITU GULATI, THE PUZZLE OF PDVSA BOND PRICES, (Aug.
16, 2016) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816856; Mark C. Weidemaier and Matthew
Gauthier, Venezuela as a Case Study in Limited (Sovereign) Liability, CAP. MKT.S L. J. (Dec.
8, 2016) (forthcoming) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882835; Mitu G. Gulati and
Mark Weidemaier, Veil Piercing When a Sovereign Owns the Shares, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 6,
2017), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/02/veil-piercing-when-a-sovereign-ownsthe-shares.html; Mitu G. Gulati and Mark Weidemaier, Stripping PDVSA’s Assets, CREDIT
SLIPS (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/02/stripping-pdvsasassets.html; Mitu G. Gulati and Mark Weidemaier, Marblegate and the Use of Exit Consents
to Restructure (Venezuelan) Sovereign Debt, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 25, 2017),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/02/marblegate-and-sovereign-restructuring.html
; and Mitu G. Gulati and Mark Weidemaier, Bankruptcy and Non-Bankruptcy Options for
PDVSA,
CREDIT
SLIPS
(Mar.
12,
2017),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/03/bankruptcy-and-non-bankruptcy-options-forpdvsa.html (discussing the various limitations of a restructuring of PDVSA).
11. LUCAS JULLIAN, GRASPING AT STRAWS: EXPLORING PDVSA’S ACCESS TO DEBTOR
RELIEF UNDER RESTRUCTURING REGIMES (June 25, 2017),
available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3005810. For example, certain articles
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the question of how PDVSA may be able to restructure its debts.12 However,
there remains a dearth of exhaustive analyses of paths involving debtor relief

and essays have focused on highly contentious maneuvers, such as possible strategies
Venezuela may pursue to strip PDVSA of its assets, or removing PDVSA’s monopoly over
the Venezuelan oil industry. See, e.g., Mitu G. Gulati and Mark Weidemaier, Strip, Swap,
Restructure,
CREDIT
SLIPS
(Feb.
15,
2018),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/02/strip-swap-restructure.html; Mitu G. Gulati
and Mark Weidemaier, Stripping PDVSA’s Assets, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 18, 2017),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/02/stripping-pdvsas-assets.html;
Ricardo
Hausmann and Mark Walker, Restructuring Debt in the Dark, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 6,
2016),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-perils-forvenezuela-by-ricardo-hausmann-and-mark-walker-2-2016-10
(suggesting
various
restructuring strategies).
Others have focused on issues of sovereign veil-piercing, in the event PDVSA or Venezuela
default. See Mitu G. Gulati and Mark Weidemaier, Veil Piercing When a Sovereign Owns
the Shares, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/02/veilpiercing-when-a-sovereign-owns-the-shares.html (discussing two issues that would arise if
PDVSA shareholders were held liable to PDVSA creditors). Since June 25, 2017, several
other articles and white papers have addressed this issue. See Richard J. Cooper and Boaz S.
Morag, Venezuela’s Imminent Restructuring and the Role Alter Ego Claims May Play in this
Chavismo
Saga,
(Nov.
9,
2017)
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068455; Mitu Gulati, Mr. Maduro
Write an Exam Question on Veil Piercing, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 23, 2017),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/11/mr-maduro-writes-an-exam-qeuestion-onveil-piercing-for-us.html; Mark Weidemaier, Domination Isn’t (Always) Fraud, CREDIT SLIPS
(Nov. 24, 2017), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/11/domination-isnt-alwaysfraud-venezuela-edition.html; Mark Weidemaier, (Updated) About that Mysterious
SLIPS
(Dec.
15,
2017),
Crystallex
Settlement,
CREDIT
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/12/about-that-mysterious-crystallexsettlement.html; Mark Weidemaier, Venezuela is Like. . .PDVSA’s Alter Ego, and Vice
Versa?, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/12/aboutthat-mysterious-crystallex-settlement.html) (discussing the challenges PDVSA creditors,
especially Crystallex, would face in pursueing alter ego claims).
12. See Lee C. Buchheit and Mitu G. Gulati, How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt
(¿Cómo restructurar la deuda venezolana?), DUKE LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL
THEORY
SERIES
NO.
2017-52
(July
21,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006680; LEE C. BUCHHEIT AND MITU
G. GULATI, DETERRING HOLDOUT CREDITORS IN A RESTRUCTURING OF PDVSA BONDS AND
PROMISORY
NOTES,
(Oct.
25,
2017),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058468; Alice Chong and Mark A.
Walker, Restructuring Certain Debt of the Republic of Venezuela and PDVSA on the Same
Terms,
(Mar.
11,
2018),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3136176; Richard J. Cooper and Mark
A. Walker, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework, (Sept. 19, 2017), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039678; Adam Lerrick, Venezuela’s
Debt: Untying the PDVSA Knot, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Oct. 30, 2917),
http://www.aei.org/publication/venezuelas-debt-untying-the-petroleos-de-venezuela-knot/
(discussing the difficulties that would arise with holdout creditors in the restructuring of
PDVSA).
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that PDVSA may be able to avail itself of under restructuring regimes.13 The
issue is not that these options are altogether forgotten, but rather that erudite
and experienced professionals and scholars seem to fundamentally disagree
on whether PDVSA has access to any relief in the first place. 14
When Ricardo Hausmann15 and Mark Walker16 published an article
discussing how Venezuela and PDVSA may seek to restructure their debts,
they believed that “PDVSA may . . . be entitled to bankruptcy protection
both in Venezuela and in the US. In this event, PDVSA could obtain a courtmandated standstill order with respect to legal action against it until a
restructuring agreement is reached, thereby avoiding a disorderly seizure of
assets.”17
13. In this paper, the term “debtor relief” refers to the legal tools available under
restructuring regimes aimed at aiding debtors in reaching restructuring agreements with its
creditors, and/or protecting the debtor against creditors’ attempts of collecting on their claims.
These tools may include a stay on creditors’ ability to collect on their claims or initiate
litigation to that end, “cramdown” provisions to bind and enforce agreements on dissenting
creditors, or the cancellation of certain contracts. In this paper, the term “restructuring
regime” refers to any legal insolvency or restructuring regime or system that may provide
tools for relief to debtors seeking to restructure their liabilities. The exception is the paper
written by Richard Cooper and Mark Walker on September 19, 2017, which explores how
restructuring regimes may be used to restructure PDVSA (see Richard J. Cooper and Mark A.
Walker, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework (Sept. 19, 2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039678 (discussing the challenges of
restructuring PDVSA)).
14. See Pedro Jiménez and Amanda Parra Cristie, Restructuring on the Rise for
Venezuelan Companies, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING REVIEW (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4adc217c-8e7b-4dbe-afbc65e34990b25f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9fec159b-0b27-4395-b24e6a4b9e633ec5/11-4-16_Restructuring_on_the_rise_for_Venezuelan_companies.pdf
(discussing the inadequacy of bankruptcy law in Venezuela to address the anticipated default
of PDVSA on U.S. bonds). On April 11, 2016, Pedro Jimenez and Amanda Parra Cristie of
Jones Day wrote an article on the different restructuring alternatives that PDVSA and other
“similarly situated Venezuelan companies” may need to consider. The article discusses the
use of Venezuela’s insolvency laws, voluntary exchanges, and the use of Chapter 15 or
Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States.
15. Ricardo Hausmann is Director of Harvard’s Center for International Development
and Professor of the Practice of Economic Development at the Kennedy School of
Government. Previously, he has served as Chief Economist of the Inter-American
Development Bank, as Minister of Planning of Venezuela, and as a member of the Board of
the Central Bank of Venezuela.
16. Mark Walker is a Managing Director and Head of Sovereign Advisory at Millstein
& Co. Previously, he was Head of Sovereign Advisory at Rothschild, a senior advisor at
Lazard, and Managing Partner of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. At Cleary, Mark was a
leader and co-founder of the firm’s sovereign practice and developed much of the
documentation that set the standard for sovereign debt restructurings during the 1980s and
1990s.
17. Ricardo Hausmann and Mark Walker, Restructuring Debt in the Dark, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-
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When Mr. Walker coauthored a more detailed article on the subject
(alongside his colleague Jill Dauchy),18 he noted that despite “the many
issues relating to PDVSA’s eligibility to seek bankruptcy protection . . . we
believe that under the circumstances envisaged there is a good chance that
Venezuela could find a way to avail itself of this powerful tool.”19 This,
however, is not a universally held view. Charles-Antoine Wauters20 and
Patrick Esteruelas21 of EMSO Asset Management22 have written that “there
is no realistic chance of a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding offering a stay that
protects assets located in the U.S. whether through a main proceeding (Chap.
11) or recognition of a foreign one (Chap. 15).”23 Additionally, Professors
Mitu Gulati24 and Mark Weidemaier25 have held that:
[I]n order to be worth anything, a Venezuelan bankruptcy
proceeding would need to be recognized in the United States . . . .
It isn’t clear that a Venezuela proceeding would merit such
recognition. Nor is it clear that PDVSA meets eligibility
requirements under US bankruptcy law. Still, bankruptcy offers
the only mechanism for imposing restructuring terms on dissenting
creditors, and that is what PDVSA most needs.26
Unfortunately for those concerned with this subject matter, these
authors have not presented the analyses behind their diverging conclusions.27
restructuring-perils-for-venezuela-by-ricardo-hausmann-and-mark-walker-2-2016-10.
18. Jill Dauchy is a Managing Director at Millstein & Co.
19. Mark Walker and Jill Dauchy, Restructuring Venezuelan Debt, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (November 14, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/14/restructuringvenezuelan-debt/. Since the working draft of this paper, Mark Walker has provided further
delineations.
20. Charles-Antoine Wauters is portfolio counsel and research analyst at EMSO Asset
Management.
21. Patrick Esteruelas is the senior analyst, sovereign credit at EMSO Asset
Management.
22. EMSO Asset Management is an asset manager focused on sovereign, quasisovereign, and corporate fixed income opportunities within emerging markets.
23. Charles-Antione Wauters and Patrick Esteruelas, Emerging Market Sovereigns’
Frequent Indulgence for their Quasi-Sovereigns, THE EMERGING MKT.S RESTRUCTURING J.
23, 23-26 (Fall 2016), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/emerging-marketsrestructuring-journal/emrj-issue-2-fall-2016/04-emerging-market-sovereigns-frequentindulgence-for-their-quasisovereigns.pdf.
24. Mitu Gulati is Professor of Law at the Duke University School of Law.
25. W. Mark C. Weidemaier is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
26. Gulati and Weidemaier, Bankruptcy and Non-Bankruptcy Options for PDVSA,
SLIPS
(Mar.
12,
2017,
3:28
PM),
CREDIT
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/03/bankruptcy-and-non-bankruptcy-options-forpdvsa.html.
27. As noted previously, since the distribution of a working draft of this Paper, Richard
Cooper and Mark Walker are the exception, as they have provided their analysis on the
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It is this omission that motivates the development of this research. This
paper seeks to explore the different forms of debtor relief PDVSA may wish
or may be able to utilize, and subsequently seeks to highlight critical issues
that may threaten access to such relief under the corresponding restructuring
regimes.
The paper focuses narrowly on the challenges related to the statutes
conforming the restructuring alternatives considered herein and does not
evaluate other issues of perhaps equal importance arising from other origins
— such as those of political nature. In particular, the paper does not
contemplate specific challenges posed by the public policy positions and
instruments of domestic or foreign public bodies that may be in force at any
given point in time. These challenges, such as the declarations of the
Venezuelan National Assembly28 or the sanctions imposed by the U.S.
Executive Branch,29 would play undeniably paramount roles in shaping a
potential use of restructuring regimes.
28. For example, certain members of Venezuela’s National Assembly (Venezuela’s
unicameral legislature) have reiterated that public debt cannot be issued without the National
Assembly’s consent and that any public debt issued without their consent will be null and
void (see Annabella Abadi M., Corruption and Phantom Bonds, CARACAS CHRONICLES (June
9, 2017), https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2017/06/09/corruption-and-phantom-bonds/
(discussing the legality and morality of public debt bonds issued by Venezuela)). Any new
public debt issued as part of a restructuring, and not condoned by National Assembly, would
be subjected to this risk. However, there is debate as to whether debt issued by PDVSA
requires the National Assembly’s approval (see Claudio Rodríguez, An Inconvenient Fact”:
Not all Debt Requires National Assembly Approval, CARACAS CHRONICLES (May 8, 2017),
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2017/05/08/inconvenient-fact-not-debt-requiresnational-assembly-approval/ (discussing the entities that are not required to get approval from
the National Assembly in issuing debt), and as to whether other public bodies may be able to
validate new public debt (such as the Venezuelan Supreme Court, the Venezuelan Executive,
or the Constituent Assembly) (see Buchheit and Gulati, Enforcing New Venezuelan Public
TIMES
(Aug.
18,
2017),
Debt
Instruments,
FINANCIAL
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/08/18/2192462/enforcing-new-venezuelan-public-debtinstruments-maduro-bonds-part-2/ (discussing the differences in the U.S. Executive and
Judicial branches recognizing Venezuela’s debt instruments)). This Paper does not address
or seek to resolve how these challenges may affect a potential restructuring of PDVSA.
29. Following the drafting of the working version of this Paper (June 25, 2017), on
August 24, 2017, the U.S. Executive Branch implemented sanctions prohibiting U.S. persons
from participating in “transactions related to, provision of financing for, and other dealings”
of new debt or new equity of PDVSA or the Government of Venezuela (Exec. Order. No.
13808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41155 § 1 (August 29, 2017)). In the Interpretive Guidance provided by
the Office of Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury, the concept of “new debt” not only
encompasses debt issued following the implementation of Executive Order 13808, but also
amendments to the terms of existing debt (see U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC FAQs,
Questions
511,
535,
https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#venezuela (discussing how OFAC defines debt
and equity and how U.S. financial institutions can complete transactions in compliance with
U.S. sanctions against Venezuela)).
Thus, assuming that an essential component of a restructuring is the issuance of new securities
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potential restructuring of PDVSA’s liabilities, but they lie beyond the scope
of this Paper.
As a note on structure, the paper is organized into three sections. The
first section provides an exploration of PDVSA’s legal form, assets, and
liabilities, so as to determine the kind of relief PDVSA may seek and be
eligible for. The second section explores the regimes PDVSA may consider
seeking relief in, and highlight obstacles that may impede access to such
relief. This section will primarily evaluate (1) a U.S. domestic proceeding
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and (2) a Venezuelan foreign
main proceeding, with recognition in the United States via a Chapter 15
petition. To round out the exercise, other alternatives will be discussed,
regardless of their theoretical or seemingly impractical nature. Finally, the
paper concludes on a wary note regarding the legal or practical viability of
any restructuring option that depends on debtor relief and highlights the
importance of being prepared for voluntary agreements or an outright
default.
I.

WHAT IS PDVSA?

In order to evaluate which kind of insolvency relief PDVSA may seek
to utilize and whether it is eligible for such relief, it is instrumental to first
understand just what, exactly, is PDVSA. Addressing this question requires
analyses on the following three fronts:
LEGAL: What is PDVSA’s legal form and relationship with the
Venezuelan State?
ASSETS & OPERATIONS: Under what jurisdictions are PDVSA’s assets
and operations?
LIABILITIES: What is the structure and nature of PDVSA’s financial
debt?
The first point — PDVSA’s legal status and relationship with the State
— is consequential on the matter of PDVSA’s eligibility for relief. The
second and third points, while also relevant on the matter of eligibility, are
intimately related to understanding the jurisdictions under which PDVSA
may seek relief. Ostensibly, PDVSA would seek to protect its operations
and assets from potential actions undertaken by creditors. This involves
understanding where those assets and operations are located, and where
and/or the amendment of existing debt, the current U.S. sanctions effectively bar any
meaningful restructuring involving U.S. parties (e.g. investors, advisors, and other U.S.
persons) from taking place. It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate how or when
such sanctions may be modified, the scope and duration of licenses possibly extended by
OFAC in the case of a restructuring, or how PDVSA or Venezuela may seek to circumvent
such sanctions in the implementation of a restructuring.
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creditors may seek to initiate and pursue actions against PDVSA.
A. Legal Form & Legal Relationship with the Venezuelan State
From a legal point of view, PDVSA is a Sociedad Anónima (“stock
corporation”) organized under Venezuelan law, whose shares are wholly
owned by the Venezuelan State.30 PDVSA was founded as part of the
Venezuelan government’s program for nationalizing the country’s oil
industry: on August 30, 1975, PDVSA was incorporated by Presidential
Decree Nº 1123,31 to “coordinate, monitor and control all operations relating
to hydrocarbons.”32 This means that, exempting certain investments carried
out in the 1990s as part of the apertura petrolera (“oil opening”),33 PDVSA
has been the ultimate owner and holding company of all oil operations in
Venezuela since 1976, when nationalization went into effect.34
As a Venezuelan commercial entity owned by the State and
participating in the hydrocarbons sector, PDVSA is subject to a legal regime
conformed by numerous laws, regulations, decrees, and norms set by the
Venezuelan government.35 However, there are three legal instruments whose
contents are critical for understanding the legal relationship between
Venezuela and PDVSA. These are, by legal hierarchy, the following:
the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, and
Decree Nº2.184: PDVSA’s Articles of Incorporation and
Corporate Statutes.

30. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., OFFERING CIRCULAR PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA,
S.A.,
OFFERS
TO
EXCHANGE,
3
(September
16,
2016)
https://www.scribd.com/document/324333858/PDVSA-2017-into-2020-Exchange-OfferOC-16-September-2016 (Accessed May 2, 2017).
31. MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR DE PETROLEO Y MINERÍA, EFEMÉRIDES
PETROMINERAS, 2, http://www.pdvsa.com/images/siembra/pdf/sp1.pdf.
32. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 3.
33. Alberto F. Ravell, A Brief Overview of Venezuela’s Oil Policies, Lex Petrola, 9
(2011),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/55dc1112-a8aa-48da-82aa73290c805b3f.pdf.
34. Venezuela Nationalizes Her Petroleum Industries, THE NEW YORK TIMES ARCHIVES,
Aug. 29, 1975, http://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/30/archives/venezuela-nationalizes-herpetroleum-industry-venezuela.html.
35. For a comprehensive list of the legal framework that governs PDVSA, see
DE
VENEZUELA,
S.A.,
MARCO
LEGAL
PETROLEOS
http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6519&Itemid=57
3&lang=es(last visited April 30, 2017).
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1. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Unique amongst any Venezuelan SOEs (let alone any Venezuelan
commercial entities), PDVSA’s relationship to the Venezuelan State was
explicitly mentioned in Venezuela’s constitution. In this respect, there are
two Articles that should be pointed out: Articles 302 and 303. While Article
302 established that “[t]he State reserves to itself, through the pertinent
organic law, and for reasons of national expediency, the petroleum industry
and other industries, operations and goods and services which are in the
public interest and of a strategic nature,”36 Article 303 stated:
For reasons of economic and political sovereignty and national
strategy, the State shall retain all shares of Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A. or the organ created to manage the petroleum industry, with
the exception of subsidiaries, strategic joint ventures, business
enterprises and any other venture established or coming in the
future to be established as a consequence of the carrying on of the
business of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.37
Thus, the nature of PDVSA’s ownership and relationship with the
Venezuelan State is enshrined in the constitution: the State reserves for itself
the domestic oil industry, and PDVSA is the entity by which Venezuela will
manage it.
2. Organic Law of Hydrocarbons
The “pertinent organic law”38 that governs the petroleum industry is the
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons (sometimes referred to simply as the “Organic
Law” in this Paper).39 Within the law, there are four particular articles that
are relevant for understanding PDVSA’s relationship with the State: Articles
22, 27, 29, and 30. While Articles 22 and 27 establish the kind of State
entities that may carry out activities related to hydrocarbons, Articles 29 and
30 govern the relationship between these entities and the State. These
Articles read as follows:40
36. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, art. 302
37. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA ASAMBLEA
NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE, CARACAS [CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF
VENEZUELA] 1999, art. 302; id. art. 303.
38. Id. art. 302.
39. LEY
ORGÁNICA
DE
HIDROCARBUROS
(Venez.)
http://www.mpetromin.gob.ve/repositorio/imagenes/file/normativas/leyes/LEY_ORGANICA
_DE_HIDROCARBUROS_CORREGIDA.pdf (last visited April 30, 2017).
40. Given that I have not been able to find an official English translation of the Law, all
translations referring to this Law are my own. Wherever a translation is made, the original
passage in Spanish will be referenced in an accompanying footnote.
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Article 22: The primary activities indicated in article 941 of this
Law, will be carried out by the State, either directly by the National
Executive or via companies of its exclusive ownership. It could
also do so via companies in which it retains control of their
decisions, by maintaining a stake greater than fifty percent (50%)
in their equity . . . .42
Article 27: The National Executive may, via Decree in a meeting
of the Cabinet,43 create any companies of the State’s exclusive
ownership in order to carry out the activities established within this
Law and in the legal forms that it deems convenient, including that
of stock corporation with a single shareholder.44
Article 29: State-owned oil companies will be governed by this
Law and its Regulations, by their own statutes, by the dispositions
dictated by the National Executive via the Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum, and by the ordinary laws that may be applicable to
them.45
Article 30: The National Executive, via the Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum, will exercise oversight and regulation over the state-owned oil
companies and their subsidiaries, both domestically and internationally, and
will dictate the guidelines and policies that must be fulfilled on the matters

41. “Primary activities,” as defined in article 9 of this Organic Law, are those related to
the exploration, extraction, collection, transportation, and storage of hydrocarbons.
42. “LEY ORGÁNICA DE HIDROCARBUROS” art. 22 (Venez.). The original Spanish reads:
“Las actividades primarias indicadas en el artículo 9 de esta Ley, serán realizadas por el
Estado, ya directamente por el Ejecutivo Nacional o mediante empresas de su exclusiva
propiedad. Igualmente podrá hacerlo mediante empresas donde tenga control de sus
decisiones, por mantener una participación mayor del cincuenta por ciento (50%) del capital
social . . . .. . .”
43. “Consejo de Ministros” has been translated as “meeting of the Cabinet,” as that is
the translation provided for the “Consejo de Ministros” in the official English translation of
the Venezuelan Constitution. See “CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF
VENEZUELA 1999,” art. 71.
44. LEY ORGÁNICA DE HIDROCARBUROS art. 27. The original Spanish reads: “El
Ejecutivo Nacional podrá mediante Decreto en Consejo de Ministros, crear empresas de la
exclusiva propiedad del Estado para realizar las actividades establecidas en esta Ley y adoptar
para ellas las formas jurídicas que considere convenientes, incluida la de sociedad anónima
con un solo socio.”
45. Id. art. 29. “Las empresas petroleras estatales se regirán por esta Ley y su
Reglamento, por sus propios estatutos, por las disposiciones que dicte el Ejecutivo Nacional
por órgano del Ministerio de Energía y Petróleo, y por las del derecho común que les sean
aplicables.”
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referred to in this Law.46
Taken together, these articles help us further understand the legal
framework that defines the relationship between PDVSA and the
Venezuelan State. Article 22 highlights the State’s concern on being able to
“control” the “decisions” of their state-owned oil companies. Articles 29
and 30, in turn, establish how that control is exerted: by the “disposition,”
“guidelines,” “policies,” “oversight,” and “regulation” dictated by the
National Executive Branch via the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (which
is now called the Ministry of the People’s Power of Petroleum and Mining
(MPETROMIN)).
3. PDVSA’s Articles of Incorporation and Corporate Statutes
The final document that should be noted is Decree Nº2.184,47 which
includes the Articles of Incorporation and Corporate Statutes of PDVSA.
This document references some of the content of the articles that have
already been mentioned and introduces new mechanisms by which the
Venezuelan State relates to PDVSA. While the document’s Articles of
Incorporation and titles I and II reinforce parts of the regulatory framework
seen in the Constitution and the Organic Law, titles III through V further
delineate how the Venezuelan State administratively relates to PDVSA.
First, citing the powers conferred by Article 27 of the Organic Law of
Hydrocarbons, the Decree ordains that: “A state-owned company48 is to be
created, under the legal form of Sociedad Anónima, which will fulfill and
execute the policies pertaining to hydrocarbons dictated by the National

46. Id. art. 30. The original Spanish reads: “El Ejecutivo Nacional, por órgano del
Ministerio de Energía y Petróleo, ejercerá las funciones de inspección y fiscalización de las
empresas petroleras estatales y sus filiales, tanto en el ámbito nacional como en el
internacional y dictará los lineamientos y las políticas que deban cumplirse sobre las materias
a que se refiere esta Ley.”
47. Given that I have not been able to find an official English translation of the Decree,
all translations referring to this Decree are my own. Wherever a translation is made, the
original passage in Spanish will be referenced in an accompanying a footnote.
48. In the original Spanish passage (see Footnote 49), the phrase is “empresa estatal,”
which could be translated as a “state-owned company,” “public sector company,” or “state
company.” Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP used “state company” when submitting a complaint
by ConocoPhillips against PDVSA (see Complaint at 18, ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v.
Petrolleos de Venezuela S.A., No. 1:16-cv-00904-UNA (D. Del. 2016) (alleging the
fraudulent transfer of assets). In Venezuela, entities (“sociedades”) in which the state has an
equal or greater ownership of 50% are considered bodies of the public sector (“organismos
del sector público”), along with their subsidiaries in which they own 50% or more of (see
“LEY ORGÁNICA DE REGIMEN PRESUPUESTARIO,” title I, art. 1) (establishing the laws that
govern public organizations).
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Executive, via the Ministry of Energy and Mines in the activities to which it
is mandated.”49
Title I (“General Dispositions”)50 establishes that PDVSA is to be
incorporated as a sociedad anónima51 and that it must fulfill its stated
objectives52 under the guidelines and policies established by the National
Executive via MPETROMIN.53 Title II (“Equity and Shares”)54 states that
all of PDVSA’s shareholder equity has been subscribed by and paid for by
the Venezuelan State,55 and that PDVSA’s shares cannot be divested, sold,
otherwise transferred, or be encumbered in any form.56 These are, in general,
legal concepts that have already been introduced in either the Constitution or
the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons.
What is new, however, are the concepts introduced in titles III (“The
Assembly”),57 IV (“Management”),58 and V (“Shareholder’s Council”).59
Broadly speaking, these titles introduce PDVSA’s corporate governance.
Title III establishes that the “supreme direction and management” of
PDVSA lies in the assembly,60 which represents the totality of the company’s
shares and their decisions.61 It further specifies that the assembly is headed
by the Minister of Energy and Mines,62 and that any other ministers selected
by the President of Venezuela may assist the assembly and represent the
State.63 Title III enumerates the attributions of the Assembly in its twelfth
clause.
Title IV (“Management”) includes chapters on PDVSA’s board of
directors,64 president of the board, and vice presidents of the board. The title
establishes that the board is the administrative body with the broadest
administrative and directive powers of PDVSA,65 and that it executes the
49. “Estatutos de PDVSA, Decreto No 2.184,” art. 1 (Dec. 10, 2002) (Venez). The
original Spanish reads: “Se crea una empresa estatal, bajo la forma de Sociedad Anónima, que
cumplirá y ejecutará la política que dicte en materia de hidrocarburos el Ejecutivo Nacional,
por órgano del Ministerio de Energía y Minas en las actividades que le sean encomendadas.”
50. Origianl Spanish: “Disposiciones Generales”
51. Decreto No 2.184: Estatutos de PDVSA, cl. 1.
52. For a comprehensive list of PDVSA’s objectives, see Id. cl 2.
53. Id. cl. 1, 2.
54. Original Spanish: “Del Capital y de las Acciones.”
55. Id. cl. 4.
56. Id.
57. Original Spanish: “De las Asambleas.”
58. Original Spanish: “De la Administración.”
59. Original Spanish: “Del Consejo del Accionista.”
60. Id. cl. 7.
61. Id. cl. 10.
62. Now called the Minister of the People’s Power of Petroleum and Mining.
63. Id. cl. 11.
64. Origianl Spanish: “Junta Directiva.”
65. Id. cl. 16.
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“supreme management of the company’s business.”66 It further establishes
that board members, and those that are to fulfill the roles of board president
and vice presidents, are designated to the board and to their roles by the
president of Venezuela by decree.67 It should be noted that the president of
the board is explicitly responsible for the “immediate direction and daily
management” of PDVSA’s business.68
Finally, title V establishes that the shareholder’s council, a body
responsible for advising the National Executive and the assembly on
PDVSA’s fulfilment on the guidelines and policies established by
MPETROMIN,69 is to be formed by three members designated by the
president of Venezuela by decree.70
Thus, the executive branch of Venezuela, which is headed by the
President of Venezuela, can directly select the members of PDVSA’s
governing bodies (assembly, board, shareholder’s council), along with the
board’s president and vice presidents.
4. Legal Summary
These three documents — the Constitution, Organic Law, and Decree
Nº2.184 — are not exhaustive of all the Venezuelan laws that govern
PDVSA and its ties to the State. They do however, help flesh out the nature
of PDVSA’s legal form. While PDVSA is unquestionably a Venezuelan
corporation wholly owned by the Venezuelan State, there is a sense that its
relationship with the State may go beyond that which is normally ascribed to
that between a company and its shareholders.
After all, the State’s whole and non-transferable ownership of PDVSA
is of constitutional character, motivated by “reasons of economic and
political sovereignty and national strategy.”71 Although PDVSA is not
explicitly called an “organ,” the Constitution does refer to any entity that
may assume PDVSA’s current role as an “organ.”72 Additionally, PDVSA
is responsible for the oil industry, which is reserved for the State as being “in
the public interest and of a strategic nature.”73 Finally, the way in which the
State governs PDVSA — as established in both the Organic Law and Decree
Nº2.184 — bring into question the distance between PDVSA and
Venezuela’s executive branch.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. cl. 27.
Id. cl. 17-18.
Id. cl. 33.
Id. cl. 39.
Id. cl. 38.
“CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA” art. 303.
Id. art. 303.
Id. art. 302.
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B. Assets
From an asset and operational point of view, there are two traits to be
noted about PDVSA: (1) its assets, operations, and employees are
overwhelmingly located in Venezuela (and to a lesser extent in the United
States, Europe, and the Caribbean) and (2) virtually all of its revenues come
from foreign clients, either as exports or as revenues from its foreign
subsidiaries.
Per PDVSA, the company carries out “exploration,
development and production (‘upstream’) operations in Venezuela,”74 while
its “sales, marketing, refining, transportation, infrastructure, storage and
shipping (‘downstream’) operations”75 are located across Venezuela, the
United States, Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia. Of its
foreign operations, it should be noted that PDVSA indirectly owns 100% of
CITGO Petroleum Corporation, which “refine[s] and market[s] . . .
transportation fuels, petrochemicals and other industrial oil-based products
in the United States.”76 PDVSA’s corporate group is composed of 368
legally verified subsidiaries in Venezuela and abroad.77
Figure 1 provides a simplified organizational chart of PDVSA’s
corporate structure, as provided by the company itself.
Figure 1: PDVSA Corporate Structure78

74.
75.
76.
77.
2016).
78.

PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 3.
Id.
Id.
PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., INFORME DEL COMISARIO 2016, 108 (Dec. 31,
Id. at 9.
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Via its subsidiaries, PDVSA Petróleo S.A. and Corporación
Venezolana de Petróleo, S.A. (CVP), PDVSA operates numerous
subsidiaries79 tasked with exploring, developing, and producing crude oil,
gas, and associated hydrocarbon products in Venezuela.80 While
Venezuela owns the largest proved reserves of crude oil in the world,81
PDVSA boasts of being the “fifth largest vertically integrated oil and gas
company . . . seventh in the world in crude oil production, seventh in
refining capacity, sixth in proved gas reserves, fifteenth in gas production,
and thirteenth in product sales.”82 As stated by PDVSA, these activities are
overwhelmingly carried out in Venezuela, which can also be attested by the
geographic distribution of its employees and property, plant, and equipment
(PP&E). As Figure 2 and

79. Per the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, PDVSA must either wholly own its
subsidiaries, or operate them as joint ventures legally referred to as empresas mixtas — in
which PDVSA must retain control and own a participation greater than 50%.
80. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 86.
81. EIA
BETA,
International
Energy
Statistics:
Venezuela,
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=0000000000000000000008&c=0
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002&ct=0&tl_id=5A&vs=INTL.57-6-VEN-BB.A&ord=CR&cy=2016&vo=0&v=H&start=1980.
82. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 86. It should be noted that
PDVSA does not own Venezuela’s oil reserves: “Venezuela [itself] owns all hydrocarbons
while they are underground and the title is passed to the holder of a concession (PDVSA,
PDVSA Petróleo S.A., CVP or the JV) at the wellhead.” Igor Hernández and Francisco
Monaldi, Weathering Collapse: An Assessment of the Financial and Operational Situation
of the Venezuelan Oil Industry 52 (CID Working Paper No. 327, 2016).
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Figure 3 show, 96% of PDVSA’s employees and 96% its PP&E (by book
value)83 are located in Venezuela.84
Figure 2: PDVSA Employees by Geography (Dec 31, 2016)85
4%

Total # of
Employees:
115,183

96%
Venezuela

Abroad

83. Caution should always be taken when evaluating PDVSA’s financial statements,
particularly when a U.S. Dollar (US$) figure is given for assets, liabilities, cash flows and
other items that may be denominated in Venezuelan Bolívares (VEF). Venezuela has multiple
official exchange rates between US$ and VEF, none of which match the black-market
exchange rate for US$. For example, per the latest available data (March 20, 2018), while the
official SICAD and DICOM rates stand at 13.50, and at 35,280.00 VEF per US$, the informal
black market exchange rate stands at 210,226.73 VEF per US$. For the formal exchange
rates, visitBanco Central de Venezuela at www.bcv.org; for the informal black-market
exchange rate, visit DolarToday: Noticias y Dòlar paralelo at www.dolartoday.com).
84. PDVSA does not geographically allocate assets that are not categorized as PP&E.
85. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., INFORME DE GESTIÓN 2016, 28.
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Figure 3: PDVSA PP&E by Geography (Book Value; Dec 31, 2016)86
4% 0%

Total PP&E:
US$ 128 Bn

96%
Venezuela

US

Other

The assets that PDVSA owns abroad are primarily (1) its CITGO
subsidiary in the United States, and (2) refineries (or equity interests in
refineries) in the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean. CITGO, a
wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA (see
Figure 1), owns three refineries (see Table 1), thirty-eight refined
product terminals, and equity interests in ten terminals via joint ventures
across twenty-two states in the United States. Additionally, CITGO has
access to 125 third-party terminals and has a retail distribution network of
5500 independently owned and operated CITGO retail outlets in the United
States.87
Including the refineries owned and operated by CITGO, PDVSA owns
or has equity interests in twelve refineries outside of Venezuela.
Interestingly, half of PDVSA’s refining capacity is found abroad: while
PDVSA’s refineries in Venezuela have a capacity of 1303 mbpd, PDVSA’s
refineries abroad have a capacity of 1303 mbpd as well (which, if measured
proportionally to PDVSA’s interest in said refineries, is 1188 mbpd).88
Table 1 shows the refineries that PDVSA currently owns or has interests in
both overseas and in Venezuela.89
18.

86. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., “CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 2016,”

87. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at A-33.
88. Id. at 106.
89. It should be noted that the Isla refinery is not actually owned by PDVSA, but rather
operated by PDVSA via a lease agreement with the government of Curação. The lease is set
to expire on December 31, 2019, and, according to Reuters, will not be renewed. See Sailu
Urribarri, Curacao inks deal with China firm to run Isla refinery, RUETERS, Sept. 19, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-refinery-investment-curacao-idUSKCN11P2GM
(discussing an agreement between the governments of China and Curacao to operate a refinery
previously operated by PDVSA). Additionally, the Jamaican government has expressed its
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Table 1: PDVSA Refineries90
Refineries
Caribbean
Isla, Curação
Camilo Cienfuegos, Cuba
Jamaica
Haina, Dominican Republic
Total, Caribbean
United States
Lake Charles, Louisiana
Corpus Christi, Texas
Lemont, Illinois
Sweeny, Texas
Total, United States
Europe
Nynäshamn, Sweden
Gothenburg, Sweden
Hamburg, Germany
Eastham, England
Total, Europe

PDVSA
Stake (% )

Controlling
Company

Partnering Firm

100
49
49
49

PDVSA
Cuvenpetrol
Petrojam
Refidomsa PDVSA

none
Commercial Cupet
PCJ*
Refidomsa

335
65
35
34
469

335
32
17
17
401

100
100
100

CITGO
CITGO
CITGO

none
none
none

425
157
167

425
157
167

50

PDV Sweeny

Conoco Phillips

0†
749

749

50
50
50
25

Nynäs
Nynäs
Nynäs
Nynäs

Neste Oil AB.
Neste Oil AB.
Neste Oil AB.
Neste Oil AB.

29
11
27
18
85

15
6
14
5
38

1,303

1,188

971
192
140
1,303

971
192
140
1,303

2,606

2,491

Total, International
Venezuela
CRP, Falcón
Puerto la Cruz, Anzoátegui
El Palito, Carabobo
Total, Venezuela
Total

100
100
100

PDVSA
PDVSA
PDVSA

none
none
none

Total Refining
Capacity (mbpd)

PDVSA pro-rata
Capacity (mbpd)

* Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica
†PDVSA does not have a participation in the Sweeny Refinery units that distill crude ; however, PDVSA has a participation in
two units within the Sweeny Refinery (a vacuum distillation unit and delayed coker). The total capacity of these units are 110
and 58 mbpd, respectively.

Furthermore, PDVSA may have significant assets abroad related to
the commercialization and transportation of its products. As shown in
Figure 4, nearly all of PDVSA’s revenue comes from exports or foreign
subsidiaries.

interest in acquiring PDVSA’s 49% stake in Petrojam. See Ezra Fieser, Jamaica Plans to Buy
Venezuela’s Stake in Kingston Refinery, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Feb. 1, 2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-01/jamaica-plans-to-buy-venezuela-sstake-in-kingston-refinery (discussing the intentions of the government of Jamacia to buy
PDVSA’s stake in an oil refinery after PDVSA deterred an upgrade to the facility).
90. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., INFORME DE GESTIÓN ANUAL 2016 68,
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/iga/IGA_2016_Compilado.pdf.
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Figure 4: PDVSA Sales (Fiscal Year ended Dec 31, 2016)91

Of those exports and overseas sales, it should be noted that “overseas sales”
are primarily generated in the United States. Figure 5 shows sales to
external clients (vis-à-vis intergroup transactions) in different countries.
Sales to external customers in the United States constitute 46% of
PDVSA’s total sales and represent 98% of all sales from overseas
subsidiaries. Finally, when contemplating total crude oil & refined
products exports, they are primarily sent to Asia and North America, as
seen in Table 2.
Figure 5: PDVSA Sales to Non-Group Customers (Fiscal Year ended
Dec 31, 2016)92

91. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 86, at 23.
92. Id. at 15.
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Table 2: PDVSA Exports by Geography (mbpd; Fiscal Year Ended Dec 31,
2016)93

This implies that PDVSA, at any given time, may have cash, accounts
receivables, inventory, and other forms of working capital abroad as it
exports oil and oil-related products. Additionally, PDVSA may also have
assets abroad tied to the transportation of said products, such as oil
tankers.94 This is important as these assets—as well as the refineries—may
be susceptible to creditor actions if PDVSA defaults on its obligations, and
if said creditors could gain enforceable judgements against PDVSA.
In their article Weathering Collaspe: Assessment of the Financial and
Operational Situation of the Venezuelan Oil Industry, Igor Hernández95 and
93. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., INFORME DE GESTIÓN 2016, at 74,
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/iga/IGA_2016_Compilado.pdf. It should be noted that
“[s]ome of these exports do not generate cash-flow for PDVSA. It is important to point out
that shipments to China are largely used for the amortization of different financing agreements
made by the Republic of Venezuela within the context of the Joint Venezuelan-Chinese Fund
and Great Volume Fund. In addition to that, a portion of the exports is heavily subsidized,
because of regional cooperation agreements with countries in Central America and the
Caribbean (e.g. Petrocaribe), as well as bilateral agreements, the most important one [being]
with Cuba.” Hernández and Monaldi, supra note 82, at 14.
94. Hernández and Monaldi, supra note 82, at 48.
95. Igor Hernández is a Professor at the Center on Energy and the Environment (CIEA)
at IESA in Caracas, and a Graduate Student Fellow at the Center on Energy Studies at the
Baker Institute at Rice University.
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Francisco Monaldi96 dedicated a chapter to analyzing PDVSA’s assets that
may be at risk of being seized by creditors. 97 As they note, the “precarious
cash flow of PDVSA has motivated questions on the exposure of the assets
of the company to seizures by creditors, in case there is a credit event on
the instruments issued by the company, or by companies that win
arbitration awards against the company or the Republic.”98 In addition to
CITGO, CITGO’s assets, and the other refineries found abroad, Hernández
and Monaldi find that PDVSA’s “liquid [and] hard currency assets, . . . oil
in transit, ships in transit, accounts receivables, inventories, and overseas
accounts”99 could be seized.100
In summary, PDVSA’s assets and operations are overwhelmingly
located within Venezuela. However, it does possess relevant assets abroad
(primarily in the United States) and it does rely nearly entirely on
international sales (substantially from the United States). If PDVSA were
to protect its assets from creditors, it would need to consider strategies to
do so both in Venezuela and in the United States.
C. Liabilities
From a liabilities point of view, it should be noted that PDVSA and its
subsidiaries have a highly complex capital structure. PDVSA has issued
debt (1) across multiple different subsidiaries, (2) subject to different
jurisdictions, and (3) with different degrees of collateral and group
guarantees.101
Figure 6 attempts to map out PDVSA’s financial debt and other
relevant liabilities across its group’s different entities, using a layout
similar to the one PDVSA uses to map its corporate structure (see Figure
1). The debt is organized along the same categories utilized by PDVSA

96. Francisco Monaldi is a Baker Institute Fellow at Rice University, Associate of the
Geopolitics of Energy Project at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, and
Founding Director and Professor at the Center on Energy and the Environment (CIEA) at
IESA.
97. Hernandez and Monaldi, supra note 82, at 48.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 52.
100. As a side note, Hernández and Monaldi point out that “[o]il in transit shipped as Free
on Board (FOB) is not available for enforcement given that property transfer to the purchaser
occurs at port and is typically delivered in shipments of third-party tankers. Meanwhile oil
shipped through Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF), could be attachable and is generally
shipped in the PDVSA owned fleet. Most of PDVSA petroleum exports are shipped FOB
and PDVSA owned-fleet is held indirectly through subsidiaries.” Id.
101. See Appendix 5: PDVSA’s Debt Collateral and Guarantees (illustrating in a table
debt issuances with collateral or group guarantees).
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when presenting data on its financial debt (as seen in its audited Financial
Debt Balance Reports and Financial Statements).102
Figure 6 PDVSA Financial Debt & Other Liabilities (Principal Value);
US$ Million
Guarantor of PDVSA’s Unsecured Bonds
Guarantor of PDVSA’s Secured Bonds
Share pledge given to PDVSA’s Secured Bonds
Share pledge given to PDVSA’s Rosneft Secured Loan
Share pledge given to CITGO Holding Inc.’s Term Loan B & Senior Secured Notes
Guarantor of PDVSA Petróleos $2,206m Credit Facility
Guarantor of Petrolera Sinovensa $4,015m Credit Facility
Guarantor of Petroboscán $2,000m Credit Facility

Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.
Venezuela
Secured Loans
2,176
Secured Bonds
2,526
Capital Leases
1
Total Secured Debt
4,703
Investment Certificates
434
Credit Notes
1,597
Credit Facilities
575
Unsec. Loans
781
Unsec. Bonds
25,396
Total Debt
33,486
Other Liabilities
30,977

Venezuela,
Distribution

Venezuela, Crude and Gas Assets
100%

100%

Corp. Ven. de Petróleo S.A.
Venezuela

60%

60%

Petrolera Sinovensa S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility
1,256

Petroquiriquire, S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility
909

626

Petrozamora S.A.
Venezuela
Prepayment Facility

143

60%

60%

20

Petrowarao S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility

6

Petrosanfelix S.A.
Venezuela
Guaranteed Bonds

9

PDVSA Cerro Negro S.A.
Venezuela
Guaranteed Bonds
1

100%
PDVSA Gas S.A.
Venezuela

N. American
Assets

PDV Holding Inc.
USA
19
121
140

100%
Panavenflot Corp.
Venezuela
Credit Facility

% of
Total Debt
79%
11%
10%
0%
100%

Other Assets

100%

100%
PDV Marina S.A.
Venezuela
Secured Loan
Capital Leases
Total Debt

Principal
US$ million
33,486
4,565
4,327
68
42,446
30,977
720
31,697
74,143

99

100%

100%
CITGO Holding Inc.
USA
Secured Loan
652
Secured Bonds
1,500
Total Debt
2,152

100%
CITGO Petroleum Corp.
USA
Secured Loans
910
Secured Bonds
650
Secured Industrial Bonds
105
Capital Leases
507
Total Secured Debt
2,172
Unsec. Industrial Bonds
3
Total Debt
2,175
Unfund. Pension Liab.
720

100%

100%

Refinería Isla S.A.
Curacao
Capital Leases

68

PDVSA Naval S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility

10

PDVSA América S.A.
Venezuela
Secured Loans
Unsecured Loans
Capital Leases
Total Debt

59
23
1
83

100%

60%
Petrodelta S.A.
Venezuela
Unsecured Loan

Petrobsocán S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility

64%

60%

Petrocedeño S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.
Venezuela
Credit Facility
1,262

Debt, PDVSA
Debt, Other Venezuelan Entities
Debt, US Entities
Debt, Curacao Entities
Total PDVSA Group Debt
Other Liab., Venezuela
Other Liab., USA
Total Other Liab.
Total Debt & Other Liab.

1

This figure maps out the debt owed by PDVSA along the different
legal entities that conform to its corporate group. Debt figures represent
principal owed, in US$ (millions). The percentage figures represent
PDVSA’s proportional ownership of those entities, where information is
available. The country of each entity’s location is noted below each’s
name. The group guarantees and share pledges presented in this Figure are
not exhaustive of the group’s intergroup guarantees and collateral
commitments.
A more detailed debt list — from which Figure 6 draws its data — can
be found in Appendix 4: PDVSA’s Financial Debt and Other Liabilities.
Information on PDVSA’s financial debts and other relevant liabilities has
been sourced from PDVSA’s 2016 Financial Statements,103 PDVSA’s 2016
Debt Balance Report,104 PDVSA’s September 2016 Exchange Offering
Circular,105 and CITGO Petroleum’s 2016 Annual Report.106 PDVSA
102. The only difference is that, for this Paper, all Credit Notes extended to suppliers have
been categorized under “financial debt” rather than “other liabilities.”
103. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 86..
104. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., “BALANCE DE LA DEUDA FINANCIERA
CONSOLIDADA,
PETRÓLEOS
DE
VENEZUELA,
S.A.”
(March
10,
2017),
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/balancededeuda2016.pdf.
105. PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 3.,
106. CITGO Petroleum Corporation, Report for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,
2016 March 2, 2017.
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arranges its financial debt along the following general categories: Bonds
(secured and unsecured), Loans (secured and unsecured), Credit Facilities,
Investment Certificates, Capital Leases, and Credit Notes.107 In addition to
these financial debts, there are other substantial liabilities that should be
taken into consideration, which include: CITGO pension and other
employee benefit liabilities, PDVSA pension and other employee benefit
liabilities, promissory notes and accounts payable owed to related
parties(including the Republic of Venezuela, the Venezuelan Central Bank
(BCV), and PDVSA’s pension funds), advances received from customers
(secured and unsecured; bearing interest and amortizations), dividends
payable to non-controlling interests, accruals to contractors (other than
Credit Notes), and interest payable for the current period.
For further information on these other obligations and their sources,
see Appendix 4: PDVSA’s Financial Debt and Other Liabilities. In Figure
6, the first item of the list — the unfunded portion of CITGO’s pension
funds — is grouped under CITGO Petroleum Corp. Items numbered two
through seven in the preceding list are grouped under “Other Liabilities” in
PDVSA.
Leaving these “other liabilities” aside, we can see that as a group,
most financial debt has been issued by Venezuela-based entities (90% of
the group’s total debt), and that most debt has been issued by PDVSA108
(79% of the group’s total debt). Most significantly, PDVSA’s nine U.S.
dollar-denominated secured and unsecured bond series represent 83% of
PDVSA’s financial debt, and 66% of the entire corporate group’s financial
debt.
Of these nine securities, at least seven109 of them (representing
US$21.92 billion in principal) contain a choice of law clause that stipulates
that the indentures will be “governed by, and construed in accordance with,
the laws of the State of New York.”110 Additionally, they include a clause
in which PDVSA consents to the “non-exclusive jurisdiction of any court
107. Credit Notes correspond to “credit notes that PDVSA signed with some of its main
suppliers . . . at an interest rate of 6.5%, a grace period of three months and maturity in three
years, with amortizations and interest payable quarterly (PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A.,
supra note 86, at 48). These notes were issued with the purpose to “partially convert the
outstanding commercial debt maintained with certain commercial suppliers into financial
debt” (Petróleos de Venezuela, supra note 30, at 72).
108. See the table in the top right corner of Figure 6: DVSA Financial Debt & Other
Liabilities (Principal Value; US$ Million).
109. I say “at least” because I have only had access to the Offering Memoranda or
Circulars of seven of PDVSA’s nine outstanding series issued in U.S. dollars. The two
issuances for which I have not been able to access Indentures or Offering Memoranda are the
6.000% Unsecured Bonds due October 28, 2022, and the 9.750% Unsecured Bonds due May
17, 2035.
110. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., supra note 30 at 156.”
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of the State of New York or any United States federal court sitting in the
Borough of Manhattan.”111 This means that if investors in these bonds
were to seek action against PDVSA on matters relating to these indentures,
they could do so in New York courts.112
Figure 7: PDVSA Debt, by Type (Principal Value; US$ million)

Interestingly, although most of PDVSA’s assets are found in
Venezuela, its financial debts are overwhelmingly subject to the law and
jurisdiction of the State of New York. If PDVSA were to ever seek relief
under a restructuring regime (particularly aimed at relieving it of litigation
from creditors), then it would be crucial for PDVSA to seek recognition
and relief from U.S. courts.
D. Summary
Summarizing findings this far, we can observe that PDVSA is: a
Venezuelan stock corporation, wholly owned by the Venezuelan State,
whose legal form and relationship to the state are governed by Venezuela’s
Constitution, Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, and Decree Nº2.184, whose
assets and operations are overwhelmingly found in Venezuela, and in
decreasing degrees in the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean, whose
revenues are primarily derived from foreign clients (primarily in the United
111. Id. All of the Offering Memoranda of PDVSA’s bond issuances I have been able to
review have similarly written language.
112. Lea Haber Kuck, The New York Courts Are Open for Business to Foreign Litigants,
DISPUTES
MAGAZINE,
April,
2013,
at
2-4,
CORPORATE
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Skadden_Reprint1_Apr13_proof.p
df.
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States and Asia), which features a complex capital structure, of which a
substantial portion of liabilities is governed by New York Law and subject
to New York jurisdiction.
With this overview in mind, we can now ponder which, if any, form of
debtor relief could be pursued by PDVSA, and whether such options would
be viable under their corresponding restructuring regimes.
II.

RESTRUCTURING REGIME & DEBTOR RELIEF ALTERNATIVES

If PDVSA were to find itself facing financial circumstances that forced it to
evaluate its access to restructuring regimes (i.e. a probable or impending
inability to finance its obligations), it would first want to determine: the
location of assets it needs to protect from creditors, and the jurisdictions
under which creditors could initiate actions against the company.
As was previously summarized, while PDVSA’s assets are primarily
in Venezuela, its financial liabilities are overwhelmingly subject to the law
and jurisdiction of the State of New York. Additionally, PDVSA relies on
revenues from abroad — a significant portion of which is sourced from the
United States in the form of exports or revenues from its U.S. subsidiaries.
Therefore, it seems that any viable strategy utilizing relief from
restructuring regimes would necessitate recognition in U.S. courts. Given
that PDVSA is a Venezuelan firm whose center of main interest (COMI) is
Venezuela, it seems that the two most appropriate ways by which to seek
recognition would be: A plenary Chapter 11 proceeding in the United
States; or a foreign main proceeding in Venezuela, recognized via an
ancillary Chapter 15 proceeding in the United States.
Notably, one of the most important forms of relief contained in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code — the automatic stay113 — would be available under
either type of proceeding (though, admittedly, in varying degrees).114
III.1.

U.S. Plenary Chapter 11 Proceeding

There are numerous advantages to seeking insolvency relief via a
plenary U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding beyond the automatic stay. The U.S.
restructuring regime is one of the most attractive and sophisticated regimes
in the world, both from a statutory point of view and due to the extensive
113. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016).
114. While the automatic stay under a plenary Chapter 11 proceeding has an
extraterritorial effect, the automatic stay available under an ancillary Chapter 15 proceeding
does not. In re JSC BTA Bank, 434 B.R. 334, 336, 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). Also, while
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code immediately provides the automatic stay for foreign main
proceedings upon recognition (11 U.S.C. § 1520), it does not do so for foreign non-main
proceedings.
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experience of the actors involved in proceedings (e.g. judges, legal counsel,
financial advisors, investors). As published by Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates (Skadden):
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is the most welldeveloped law of any insolvency regime in the world for helping
troubled companies restructure their affairs. Some nations, like
Canada and the United Kingdom, also have insolvency regimes
that are very helpful for restructuring businesses, but few others
do, and none of these systems is as commercially oriented as
Chapter 11.115
Beyond the automatic stay on possible domestic creditor actions to
pursue their claims against the debtor, the advantages of Chapter 11 include
(but are not limited to) (1) the ability to restructure liabilities via a plan of
reorganization that requires “less than unanimous stakeholder support,”116
(2) a period of exclusivity of at least 120 days and up to eighteen months in
which only the debtor can present a plan of reorganization,117 (3) an
automatic stay with extraterritorial effect, potentially stymieing creditor
actions on the debtor’s property anywhere in the world,118 and (4) a
“presumption that the debtor’s management will remain in place rather than
be replaced by a trustee.”119 These features provide substantial tools,
negotiating leverage, and procedural control to debtors seeking relief.
At first glance, it would seem possible for PDVSA to file for Chapter
11 protection. As expressed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a voluntary case
can be “commenced . . . by an entity that may be a debtor,”120 and that
“only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or
property in the United States . . . may be a debtor under this title.”121
115. Mark S. Chehi, Jay M. Goffman, Chris Mallon, and Mark A. McDermott, Using
Chapter 11 to Restructure Non-US and Multinational Companies, SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/using-chapter-11-restructure-non-us-and-multinationalcompanies.
116. Id. Per the article: “Significantly, for an impaired class to be deemed to have
accepted a plan, only one-half of the creditors in that class, holding two-thirds of the debt in
that class, must vote in favor of the plan — counting only those who actually vote.”
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (a),(b),(d).
118. “Caselaw indicates that the automatic stay applies to all of a debtor’s property, no
matter where that property is located in the world; that is, the automatic stay has an
extraterritorial effect. However, the worldwide application of the automatic stay is subject to
foreign courts’ willingness to grant comity, i.e., deference to U.S. law.” KIRKLAND & ELLIS
LLP, DISTRESSED DEALMAKING: CHAPTER 11 AND OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURING, (2015).
119. Antony Zacaroli QC and Alexander Riddiford, Schemes of arrangement and Chapter
11 of the US Bankruptcy Code: a comparative view, SOUTH SQUARE DIGEST, Dec. 2015, at
10, http://www.southsquare.com/files/DigestDecember2015.pdf.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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Although PDVSA is a Venezuelan firm headquartered and mainly
operating in Venezuela, it clearly has property in the United States. In fact,
several firms with far fewer assets and weaker ties to the United States
have successfully petitioned and carried out Chapter 11 proceedings. Table
3 presents a few cases where a debtor’s eligibility was challenged on the
grounds of not satisfying the requirements set forth in 11 U.S.C § 109(a),
but which were subsequently deemed eligible based on their U.S.
property.122

122. For examples of cases in which companies incorporated in foreign jurisdictions have
been able to satisfy §109 with minimal ties to the United States, despite motions to dismiss
the case presented by creditors on the basis of challenging said eligibility of §109, see, e.g.,
In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that §109 eligibilty is satisfied by even a minimal amount of property); In re
GLOBAL OCEAN CARRIERS LTD, 251 B.R. 31, 31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (holding that
U.S. bank accounts constitute property for §109 eligibility, regardless of the amount of funds
in the accounts); In re Axona Int’l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 597 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding §109 satisfied by the presence of a U.S. bank account).
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Table 3: Foreign Debtors Satisfying §109(a) in Chapter 11 Proceedings

Debtor
Avianca123

Foreign
Debtors’
Country
Colombia

Axona130

Hong Kong

Global
Ocean
Carriers133

Cyprus,
Singapore,
Liberia

U.S. Assets & Operations
• 28 employees (0.6% of its 4,329
employees worldwide)124
• 24% of revenues stemming
from Colombia-U.S. flights125
• Aircraft that fly to the United
States126
• Substantial subsidiary127
• U.S. credit card receivables128
• Contract rights (including
leases)129
• Substantial bank deposits131
• Property interests132
• Stock of U.S. subsidiary
incorporated in Delaware134
• Two bank accounts135
• Retainer paid to legal counsel,
held in escrow136

As noted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York when judging the eligibility of Avianca, “[c]ases that have
construed the ‘property’ requirement with respect to foreign corporations
and individuals have found the eligibility requirement satisfied by even a

123

In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca.
Ibid., at *2-3.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid., at *29-30.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd.
131
Ibid., at *61-62.
132
Ibid.
133
In re GLOBAL OCEAN CARRIERS LTD.
134
Ibid., at *11.
135
Ibid., at *16.
136
Ibid., at *18.
124
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minimal amount of property located in the United States.”137 Thus,
superficially, it would seem that Chapter 11 may be a possible option for
PDVSA.
However, there are at least two significant legal challenges — and one
practical difficulty — that a petition by PDVSA would have to overcome.
The first is one of eligibility: does PDVSA satisfy the definition of
“person” per the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? The second is one of court
discretion: even if PDVSA were eligible for Chapter 11 relief, would a
U.S. court recognize the case or dismiss it? Finally, even if PDVSA were
eligible and its petition recognized, it would still have to deal with the
challenge of passing a plan of reorganization without utilizing the
“cramdown.”
A. Challenge #1: Eligibility
As manifested in 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), “only a person . . . may be a
debtor” in the context of a Chapter 11 proceeding. The U.S. Bankruptcy
Code states that “the term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and
corporation, but does not include governmental unit[.]”138 The definition of
“governmental unit,” in turn, includes “foreign state” or “department,
agency, or instrumentality of . . . a foreign state . . . .”139 Given what has
already been discussed about PDVSA’s relationship with the Venezuelan
State, could PDVSA be categorized as a “governmental unit” of the
Venezuela State, and thus, be ineligible for Chapter 11 relief?
The first issue in addressing this question is that neither “department,”
“agency,” nor “instrumentality” are defined in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
which means that their definition must be sought elsewhere. In order to
address this issue, two venues for possible answers will be explored: (1) a
review of how PDVSA has been treated in U.S. courts, and (2) a review of
how bankruptcy courts have dealt with these terms.
Regarding existing precedent for how PDVSA has been classified in
U.S. courts, it is interesting to note that both PDVSA and one of its
subsidiaries have already been deemed to be agencies or instrumentalities
of Venezuela (albeit not in the context of bankruptcy).140 In fact, PDVSA
itself has argued that it is an instrumentality of the Venezuelan State when
137. In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. at 18.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
140. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. CV 17-MC-151LPS, 2018 WL 3812153 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2018) (On August 9, 2018, a few days prior to the
publication of this Paper, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware determined that
PDVSA is not merely an agency or instrumentality of Venezuela, but “that PDVSA is the
alter ego of Venezuela”).
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defending itself in certain suits brought against it in U.S. courts. The
question of whether PDVSA is an “instrumentality” has already appeared
in U.S. courts because of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
The FSIA “is the exclusive source of jurisdiction for claims against foreign
states or their instrumentalities in the courts of the United States.”141 Per
the FSIA:
For purposes of this chapter —
A ‘foreign state’ . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined
in subsection (b).
An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity
— which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.142
Since Venezuela owns “a majority” of PDVSA’s shares, any entity
introducing suits against PDVSA in the United States must address the
FSIA. In Crystallex International Corp. v. Pdv Holding Inc., PDVSA was
referred to by the court as “undisputedly . . . an ‘agency or instrumentality’
of Venezuela.”143 In Helmerich & Payne Internationall Drilling Co. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, PDVSA and PDVSA Petróleo conceded
to being “agencies or instrumentalities of Venezuela, as that term is defined
at 28 U.S.C. §1603(b).”144
Finally, in RSM Prod. Corp. v. Petroleos de Venez. Societa Anonima,
PDVSA and PDVSA Petróleo sought to have RSM’s complaint dismissed
on the grounds that both PDVSA and PDVSA Petróleo were immune per
the FSIA.145 RSM, however, countered that PDVSA Petróleo was not
immune as it did not “fall within the definition of a ‘foreign state’ under the
FSIA.”146 The court agreed with RSM that PDVSA Petróleo was not an
instrumentality on the basis of its ownership, as it was not directly owned
by Venezuela but rather indirectly via Venezuela’s ownership of PDVSA
(see

141. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Petroleos de Venez. Societa Anonima, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1208,
1210 (D. Colo. 2004).
142. 28 U.S.C. §1603(a)(b).
143. 251 F. Supp. 3d 758, 762 (D. Del. 2017).
144. 971 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2013).
145. RSM Prod. Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
146. Id. at 1214.
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Figure 1 for a map of PDVSA’s corporate structure). However, the
court sought to determine whether PDVSA Petróleo could still be deemed
an “agency or instrumentality” of Venezuela by satisfying the definition of
“organ.”147 Applying a multifactor analysis on PDVSA Petróleo and its
relationship to the Venezuelan State,148 the court concluded that it was an
organ of Venezuela. Specifically, the court listed the following evidence as
supportive of its conclusion:
(1) PDVSA Petróleo was created under a resolution issued by the
Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Mines;
(2) PDVSA was created as an instrument of the Venezuelan state’s
oil policy, and PDVSA Petróleo is simply the exploration and
operating arm of PDVSA;
(3) Venezuelan law requires that oil and gas activities be undertaken
for the public welfare and social interest;
(4) PDVSA Petróleo must follow in detail the policies, guidelines,
and direction of the Venezuelan government, making its
activities public in nature;
(5) PDVSA Petróleo generally is governed by public law in
Venezuela; and
(6) PDVSA Petróleo’s ownership structure demonstrates a very
close tie to the Venezuelan government. Again, PDVSA Petróleo
is wholly owned by PDVSA, which is wholly owned by the
Venezuelan government.149
What is interesting to note about these observations of PDVSA
Petróleo’s relationship with the Venezuelan State is that they could also be
very much said about PDVSA’s relationship with Venezuela. It seems that,
under the FSIA, PDVSA would be considered an “instrument” or “agency”
of the Venezuelan State either by the nature of its ownership or by a
broader analysis of its ties and relationship with the Venezuelan State.
Although it would be tempting to begin drawing conclusions from these
precedents, it should be recalled that none of these cases took place in the

147. Id. at 1215.
148. “Several factors are relevant to an assessment of organ status under the FSIA. These
factors include (1) the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; (2) the purpose of its
activities; (3) the degree of supervision by the government; (4) the level of government
financial support; (5) the entity’s employment policies, particularly regarding whether the
foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (6) the entity’s
obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s laws; and (7) the ownership structure of
the entity. USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 209 (3rd Cir. 2003). “No one factor
is determinative.” RSM Prod. Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
149. Id. at 1215-16.
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context of bankruptcy. For the sake of thoroughness, bankruptcy cases that
have dealt with this issue of “personhood” should also be considered.
A relevant bankruptcy case to draw attention to on the matter of
defining “governmental unit”150 within bankruptcy proceedings is Kentucky
Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services Inc., (In re Seven
Counties Servs.).151 In this case, Seven Counties (a non-profit mental
health services provider) had its Chapter 11 filing challenged by the
Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS), which argued that Seven
Counties was a “governmental unit,” and thus ineligible for Chapter 11
relief. In settling this complaint, the bankruptcy court had to define the
terms “department,” “agency,” and “instrumentality.” For both
“department” and “agency,” the court developed their definitions from the
“plain meaning” of the words as expressed in Black’s Law Dictionary. In
Black’s Law Dictionary, “department” was defined as “a principal branch
or division of government,”152 and “agency” as “state offices, departments,
divisions, bureaus, boards and commissions.”153
The court found, however, that the plain meaning of “instrumentality”
(as provided by Black’s Law Dictionary) was of “little assistance.”154
Therefore, the court adopted a three-factor analysis that had been
developed in In re Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2010) to determine whether an entity was to be deemed an
“instrumentality.” Referring to the work conducted by the court In re Las
Vegas Monorail, the court described the three factors of the analysis as
follows:
The first [factor] was whether the entity has any of the powers
typically associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, the
power to tax or sovereign immunity. If such powers were weakly
present or do not exist, then courts examined the second area,
which is whether the entity has a public purpose, and if so, the level
of control exerted by the state on the entities activities in furthering
the purpose. The more control over day to day operations, the
more likely the entity is to be an instrumentality under 11 U.S.C.
§101(40). The third area is the effect of the state’s own
designation and treatment of the entity.155
150. See Nicholas D. Panzarella, “Determining the Meaning of “Instrumentality” in the
Bankruptcy Code,” 7 ST. JOHN’S BANKR. RES. LIBR. NO. 17 (2015) (engaging in a broader
discussion into the definition of “governmental unit” and “instrumentality,” in particular).
151. 511 B.R. 431, 431 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. May 30, 2014).
152. Id. at 464. In addition, the court was satisfied with the definition for “department”
as it “comport[ed] with federal statutory interpretation of the term in case law.” Id.
153. Id. at 465.
154. Id. at 466.
155. Id. at 467.
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When applying this three-factor analysis to PDVSA, it is highly likely
that it would be considered an “instrumentality” and thus a “governmental
unit.” Regarding the first factor — presence of powers typically associated
with sovereignty — we have already seen that PDVSA and PDVSA
Petróleo benefitted from sovereign immunity per the FSIA in order to
dismiss legal actions taken against them by RSM. Additionally, in 2010,
when the Venezuelan National Assembly declared Helmerich & Payne’s
Venezuelan assets to be of public interest, President Chávez directed
PDVSA to seize their assets. Ultimately, PDVSA was the entity that filed
the eminent domain actions aimed at expropriating Helmerich & Payne’s
assets.156 Thus, it seems that PDVSA would satisfy the analysis’ first factor
for being an instrumentality.
Considering the second factor — public purpose and government
control — it also seems that PDVSA would satisfy the definition of an
instrumentality. If a court were to apply the same exercise that the District
Court for Colorado carried out on PDVSA Petróleo (which allowed it to
conclude that it was an “organ” of the Venezuelan State) on PDVSA
instead, there would seem to be no apparent reason to believe it would lead
to any different conclusion. If anything, such a test would likely reveal an
even stronger case on the “public purpose” and “state control” of PDVSA,
given the constitutional nature of both its ownership and role.
On the final factor — the State’s own treatment of the entity being
analyzed — insufficient research has been done for the purposes of this
paper to justify proposing a view. However, given PDVSA’s likely
outcome under the first and second factors of analysis, one would be hardpressed to argue that PDVSA is not an “instrumentality” of the Venezuelan
State given their current relationship.
Thus, either by looking at the precedent of how PDVSA has been
treated in U.S. courts, or the precedent of how bankruptcy courts have
defined the “governmental unit” (particularly “instrumentalities”) it is fair
to question whether PDVSA would be eligible for Chapter 11 relief. Such
a petition would surely be contentious and possibly challenged by creditors
or other dissenting parties.157

156. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 971 F. Supp.
2d 49, 49 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013).
157. For the sake of thoroughness, it should also be noted that that the U.S. Executive
Branch has already acknowledged PDVSA as an “instrumentality” of the Venezuelan
Government. In Executive Order 13808, the term “Government of Venezuela” is defined as
“the Government of Venezuela, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including the Central Bank of Venezuela and PDVSA.” Exec. Order. No. 13808, 82 Fed.
Reg. 41155 §3(d) (August 29, 2017). One may wonder if a U.S. bankruptcy court would
consider this designation by the U.S. Executive when identifying PDVSA’s “personhood.”
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B. Challenge #2: Avoiding Dismissal by U.S. Courts
Another significant challenge accompanying the petitioning of a
Chapter 11 case is the broad discretion and expansive powers that U.S.
bankruptcy courts have to dismiss a Chapter 11 petition or case. The
bankruptcy courts’ power to dismiss or suspend a case are established in 11
U.S.C. §§305 and 1112. While §305 states that a court can dismiss or
suspend a case when “the interests of creditors and the debtor would be
better served by such dismissal or suspension,” §1112 provides for
expansive, though not exhaustive, facts and circumstances of inquiry which
would allow a court to dismiss a case.158 In addition, as was the case in In
re Yukos Oil Co.,159 a court may dismiss a case not on the basis of any one
particular reason, but rather on a “totality of circumstances.”160
Although the context and circumstances of a potential Chapter 11
filing by PDVSA would be very different to those of Yukos’ failed petition,
In re Yukos Oil Co. is still illustrative of the kind of quandary a PDVSA
filing would put U.S. courts in. It also highlights the broad discretion U.S.
bankruptcy courts possess to dismiss a case.
For some background on In re Yukos Oil Co., Yukos used to be an
open, joint-stock oil company incorporated under the laws of the Russian
Federation.161 In 2003, Yukos began facing disputes with the Russian
government, which ultimately levied retroactively-assessed taxes of $27.5
billion on Yukos.162 On November 19, 2004, the Russian government
announced it would auction off Yukos’ shares in its largest subsidiary.163
Reacting to this and the retroactively-assessed taxes, Yukos’ management
board transferred some banking resources to the United States, hired legal
counsel in the United States, and petitioned for a Chapter 11 filing on
December 14, 2004.164 Steven Theede, CEO of Yukos at the time, testified
that the purpose of the Chapter 11 filing was to “obtain a halt in the
Russian government’s action to enforce its tax claims, to obtain the
financial flexibility to obtain loans superior to claims of the Russian
government, to finance operations, to restructure tax debt, and to create a
surviving entity to seek redress against the Russian government.”165
Facing this case, the court opened its memorandum opinion by
remarking that:
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

11 U.S.C. §§305, 1112.
321 B.R. 396, 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2005).
Id. at 400.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403.
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This is a very large case . . . the debtor is . . . a Russian company,
and its assets are massive relative to the Russian economy, and,
since they are primarily oil and gas in the ground, are literally a
part of the Russian land. While there is precedent for maintenance
of a bankruptcy case in the United States by corporations
domiciled outside the United States, none of those precedents
cover a corporation which is a central part of the economy of the
nation in which the corporation was created.166

This concern over the size and importance of Yukos in relation to the
Russian economy turns out to be central in the court’s decision to dismiss
the case. When enumerating the “totality of circumstances” that led to the
dismissal of the case, the court mentions some points that may be relevant
when contemplating the viability of a filing by PDVSA. The court held
that:
Several facts . . . contribute to cause for its dismissal . . . since most of
Yukos’ assets are oil and gas within Russia, its ability to effectuate a
reorganization without the cooperation of the Russian government is
extremely limited. Additionally, it is not clear that this court can
obtain personal jurisdiction of the pertinent parties sufficient to grant
much of the relief sought in the instant case.
The vast majority of the business and financial activities of Yukos
continue to occur in Russia. Such activities require the continued
participation of the Russian government, in its role as the regulator of
production of petroleum products from Russian lands, as well as its role
as the central taxing authority of the Russian Federation.
Finally, although the act of state doctrine, standing alone, does not
compel dismissal of the instant case, the evidence indicates that Yukos
was, on the petition date, one of the largest producers of petroleum
products in Russia, and was responsible for approximately 20 percent
of the oil and gas production in Russia. The sheer size of Yukos, and
correspondingly, its impact on the entirety of the Russian economy,
weighs heavily in favor of allowing resolution in a forum in which
participation of the Russian government is assured.167
Given the location of Yukos’ assets (overwhelmingly in Russia),
Yukos’ size in relation to the Russian economy, and the degree of
involvement of the Russian government in Yukos’ operations, the
bankruptcy court was unwilling to carry out a case without the
acquiescence and “assured” participation of the Russian government.168
166. Id. at 399.
167. Id. at 410-11.
168. It is instructive to compare In re Yukos Oil Co. with In re Aerovias Nacionales de
Colomb. S.A., and how the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in
that case. Avianca, a Colombian airline, filed for Chapter 11 relief in the United States on
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Although a voluntary Chapter 11 petition carried out by PDVSA would
presumably count with the support of the government, the precedent set by
Yukos should establish some serious doubts concerning U.S. courts’
willingness to recognize such a petition.
In In re Yukos Oil Co., the bankruptcy court was likely correct in
judging that, given Yukos’ systemic importance to the Russian economy,
and that nearly all of its assets were in Russia, a proceeding would be futile
without the explicit approval of the Russian government. If a U.S. court
felt uncomfortable recognizing Yukos due to its size relative to the Russian
economy, how comfortable would a U.S. court feel presiding over a case
involving PDVSA, given its role in the Venezuelan economy? Recall that
PDVSA owns and controls the entire hydrocarbons industry for the
Venezuelan State. PDVSA is “a driver of Venezuela’s economy, a key
source of the government’s revenues and the country’s primary source of
foreign exchange.”169 Via numerous taxes, royalties, dividends, social
development programs, transfers, and cash-for-oil loans,170 PDVSA has
historically been a critical source of funding for the Venezuelan State and
its numerous social policies.
March 21, 2003. Beginning on April 11, 2003, some of its creditors challenged the filing,
arguing that it should be dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§305(a) and 1112(b). Regarding
§305(a), the creditors argued that “it would not be in the ‘best interests’ of the Debtors or their
creditors to allow this case to proceed, and that Avianca should be compelled to file in
Colombia. The movants argue that Avianca’s choice of forum creates delay and uncertainty
for all creditors (but especially for those in the United States), demonstrates bad faith, and
allows depletion of the airline’s assets by its foreign creditors, who may either receive
voluntary payments from the Debtors in satisfaction of prepetition debts, or, being beyond
this Court’s effective jurisdiction, can ultimately collect upon their outstanding debts free of
the restraint of U.S. law.” In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. at 78.
On §1112(b), the creditors held that the “Debtors will never be able to confirm an effective
plan of reorganization when a majority of their creditors are not subject to this Court’s
effective jurisdiction and there is no parallel proceeding in Colombia.” Id.
The Court, however, sustained Avianca’s Chapter 11 proceeding on numerous grounds,
including that (1) there was no showing that Avianca could have obtained jurisdiction over
its lessors and other major financial creditors in Colombia, (2) the Colombian counterpart of
Chapter 11, Law 550, was only four years old and relatively untested, particularly in large
cases, (3) that the great bulk of Avianca’s creditors had been well served by the proceedings,
(4) the fact that many of Avianca’s principal creditors were in the United States, and that
major Colombian parties were both willing and fully participating in the proceeding, and (5)
that there would likely have been extensive litigation over “whether Law 550 [met] each of
the criteria . . . in order to be entitled to recognition [in the United States].” Id. at 16.
In other words, the court’s support for Avianca’s filing was crucially based on the willing
support and participation of Avianca’s Colombian counterparties in the Chapter 11
proceeding, and the fear that U.S. recognition of a Colombian proceeding would be “hotly
contested,” and thus a worse alternative compared to Chapter 11. Id.
169. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 6, at 1.
170. Hernández and Monaldi, supra note 82, at 22-26.
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The key problem in Yukos, however, was not Yukos’s size, itself, but
rather that it demanded the need for jurisdiction over or participation of the
Russian government. This raises the question: what guarantees could a
U.S. bankruptcy court offer the Venezuelan government in order to
convince the Venezuelan government to submit itself to the proceedings
and rulings of a U.S. federal court?
Given the number of issues raised in In re Yukos Oil Co, one can only
speculate as to how a court would react when confronted by the “totality of
circumstances” presented by a Chapter 11 filing by PDVSA.171 Surely it is
difficult to envisage that any U.S. bankruptcy court would feel entirely at
ease with all the contentious elements that such a petition may raise.
C. Challenge #3: A Practical Procedural Obstacle in Passing a Plan
Beyond the matters of eligibility and recognition, there is also a
significant practical issue that should be addressed: the challenge of
passing a plan of reorganization approved by all creditor classes. If
PDVSA pursued Chapter 11 relief to impair its creditors and Venezuela
sought to retain ownership over any of PDVSA’s shares, let alone the
100% required by Venezuela’s Constitution and Decree Nº2.184, then a
plan of reorganization presented by PDVSA would require the approval of
all impaired creditor classes. Per the “absolute priority rule,” 172 PDVSA
would not be able to use a “cramdown” to impose a plan on dissenting
impaired creditor classes.
This implies that a PDVSA Chapter 11 would be a highly consensual
affair,173 requiring the approval of creditors representing at least two-thirds
171. Such a “totality of circumstances” would only be aggravated were the sanctions
introduced by Executive Order 13808 (or similar public policy instruments) to remain extant
in the event of a Chapter 11 filing.
172. The “absolute priority rule” provides that “a nonaccepting class of creditors or
interest holders cannot be compelled to accept less than full compensation while a more junior
creditor or equity holder receives anything or retains its interest in the debtor under the plan”
Gary L. Kaplan, Understanding The Rules of Bankruptcy Cramdown, LAW 360, Sept. 4, 2013,
https://www.law360.com/articles/468678/understanding-the-rules-of-bankruptcycramdown. As delineated in 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b), the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides that a
plan that is rejected by an impaired class may still be confirmed if (1) it does not unfairly
discriminate against impaired, nonaccepting creditors, (2) is fair and equitable, and (3)
satisfies all other provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). The “absolute priority rule” refers to the
“fair and equitable” treatment requirement. For a further discussion of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code’s cramdown provisions, see Kaplan, Understanding The Rules of Bankruptcy
Cramdown.
173. There may be an exception to this under the “new value” doctrine, wherein “old
equity holders may retain their interests by contributing new money or money’s worth that is
substantial and essential to the company’s reorganization efforts, even if there are creditors
that would remain impaired.” (Robin Bicket White, The New Value Exception to the Absolute
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of claims in amount, and more than one half in number in each impaired
class.174 Conversely, this means that any dissenting creditor (or group of
creditors) seeking to block a plan of reorganization could do so by simply
owning more than a third of any impaired class.
Given this constraint, if PDVSA ever sought Chapter 11 relief, it
would likely attempt to do so as a pre-negotiated or pre-packed plan.175
The motivation for doing so would be to minimize the time spent in
bankruptcy and reduce the risk of losing control of the process to any
holdouts over the course of a proceeding. Attempting to carry out a prenegotiated or pre-packaged filing, however, may have the
counterproductive effect of informing potentially dissenting creditors of
PDVSA’s intentions, granting them time to prepare legal challenges against
an eventual proceeding.

Priority Rule is Alive and Well after 203 North LaSalle, FROST TODD BROWN,
http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources-1564.html (last visted May 27, 2017)). (Kaplan,
supra note 172). In other words, “equity holders . . . invest new capital to ‘buy back’ their
equity interests . . . while the equity holders receive new equity in the reorganized debtor, the
equity holders also provide value to the estate in the form of compensation for such interest.
Notably, the value does not have to be enough to provide full payment to a nonaccepting class
of unsecured creditors.” Kaplan, supra note 172.
Although “courts have not applied the new value doctrine evenly,” (Kaplan, supra note 172)
the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that existing shareholders cannot be given the
exclusive opportunity to purchase new equity (see Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203
N. Lasalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 434 (1999) (holding that the debtor could not use
cramdown to approve a reorganization plan when the plan violated the absolute priority rule).
Thus, the process by which new interests are offered may be legally viable, as long as it is
open to bidders in a “market-driven auction process” (Kaplan, supra note 172). For further
discussion on the new value doctrine, see Kaplan, supra note 172; Bicket White, supra note
173; and Dana Hall, Plucked From the Bargain Bin: Testing the Limits of the new Value
Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG (March 6, 2013),
https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-11-plans/plucked-from-the-bargainbin-testing-the-limits-of-the-new-value-exception-to-the-absolute-priority-rule/.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
175. “In a classic reorganization, the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, eventually
negotiates a plan of reorganization with its creditors, seeks court approval of a disclosure
statement, and then solicits votes in favor of the plan . . . . With a prepackaged bankruptcy,
on the other hand, the debtor negotiates its bankruptcy plan, arranges dip financing, if
necessary, and solicits votes on the plan before ever filing bankruptcy. Upon filing its
bankruptcy petition, the debtor will file its disclosure statement, its plan, the results of its
prepetition solicitation, and a motion seeking both approval of the disclosure statement and
confirmation of the plan. Courts will consider the disclosure statement and confirm the plan
in a single hearing near the outset of the case. A renegotiated plan generally refers to a plan
that is agreed to, at least in concept, by the major constituents of the debtor. The process of
soliciting bids does not officially begin, however, until some time after the case is filed.”
Steven M. Hedberg and Brain A. Jennings, Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Ch. 11 Plans,
LAW 360 Sept. 2, 2009, https://www.law360.com/articles/120120/prepackaged-andprenegotiated-ch-11-plans.
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Thus, even if PDVSA were eligible for Chapter 11 relief, and even if
it achieved recognition by U.S. courts, it would still have to navigate the
difficulties of passing a fully consensual176 plan of reorganization.
III.

VENEZUELAN FOREIGN MAIN PROCEEDING & ANCILLARY
CHAPTER 15 RECOGNITION

PDVSA could alternatively seek to avail itself of relief in the United
States by initiating a proceeding in Venezuela, and then seek recognition of
that proceeding in an ancillary Chapter 15 case in the United States.177
Although such a strategy may initially appear theoretically possible, it
unfortunately would face significant challenges of eligibility, limited relief,
or outright dismissal in U.S. courts.
A. Challenge #1: Eligibility
At first glance, this path would seem to be a viable way by which to
skirt the issue of PDVSA’s “personhood.” Sections 1515 and 1517 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which deal with the “Application for
recognition”178 and “Order granting recognition,”179 only refer to the
“foreign representative”180 and the “foreign proceeding,” and do not include
any eligibility requirements demanded from the “debtor.” Additionally,
under the definitions of Chapter 15, a “debtor” “means an entity that is
176. “Fully consensual” here implies a plan that is accepted by all creditor classes. Such
a plan could be rejected but still imposed upon creditors representing one-third of claims in
amount and one-half in number across all impaired classes.
177. Since PDVSA alerts its creditors that it may be subject to Venezuelan bankruptcy or
insolvency laws as part of the “Risk Factors” in the Offering Memorandums/Circulars of its
notes (see PETRÓLEOS DE VENEZUELA, S.A., supra note 30, at 24). This Paper assumes that a
PDVSA Venezuelan insolvency proceeding would follow the existing insolvency statutes in
Venezuela’s Commercial Code.
However, it should be noted that this issue may not be as straightforward as it seems. Per
Roland Pettersson Stolk’s paper on the subject (see Roland Pettersson Stolk, PDVSA’s
Bankruptcy: A look from Venezuelan Law, in the context of a Default, (LEC Abogados
Working Paper, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064214). There
are outstanding debates on (1) whether PDVSA can file for bankruptcy in Venezuela, and (2)
assuming it could declare bankruptcy, whether such a proceeding would be governed by the
statutes of the Commercial Code or by the statutes of Venezuelan Administrative Law (which
apply to proceedings involving the Venezuelan State and other public sector entities).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 1515.
179. 11 U.S.C. § 1517.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (24): “The term ‘“foreign representative’” means a person or a body,
including a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding
to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as
a representative of such foreign proceeding.”
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subject of a foreign proceeding.”181 An “entity,” in turn, under the
definition of the Bankruptcy Code, “includes person, estate, trust,
governmental unit, and United States trustee.”182 This definition of
“debtor” differs from that which is found in 11 U.S.C. § 109, crucially
including “governmental unit” by defining a “debtor” as an “entity” and not
as a “person.” Although peculiar, this difference may make sense, as §109
only explicitly mentions Chapters 7, 9, 12, and 13, and never makes any
reference to Chapter 15. Thus, it seems, the question of whether PDVSA is
a “person” or a “governmental entity” may be irrelevant, if PDVSA were
seeking relief in the United States under an ancillary Chapter 15
proceeding.
However, it is unclear whether PDVSA’s eligibility would go
unchallenged. In In re IR Bank Resolution Corp. (In Special
Liquidation),183 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware
stated that “only a ‘person’ may be a debtor in a Chapter 15 case.”184 The
statement is odd: it seems to apply an eligibility requirement concerning
Chapter 11 (i.e. the definition of debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)) to
Chapter 15, whose sections never stipulate such a requirement.
Nonetheless, this statement introduces the question of whether a court
would require PDVSA to satisfy the definition of “person” in order to be
deemed eligible for a Chapter 15 proceeding. It would go to reason that if
PDVSA were to be classified as a “governmental unit” and not a “person”
for purposes of a plenary Chapter 11 proceeding, so too would it be
classified as a “governmental unit” within the context of an ancillary
Chapter 15 proceeding, making it ineligible for relief either way.
On the other hand, in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v.
Barnet (In re Barnet),185 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
made a nuanced applicability of 11 U.S.C. §109(a) to Chapter 15
proceedings, specifically on the issue of the definition of “debtor.” In the
aforementioned case, the court ruled that 11 U.S.C. §109(a) also applies to
Chapter 15, as 11 U.S.C. §103(a) states that Chapter 11 (which includes 11
U.S.C. §109(a)) applies “in any case under Chapter 15.”186 However, the
Court specified that this only pertains to the property requirement
imbedded in 11 U.S.C. §109(a), and not to the definition of “debtor.” The
Court distinguished that the definition of “debtor” differed between

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

11 U.S.C. § 1502.
11 U.S.C. § 101 (15)
59 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 135, 135 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 30, 2014).
Id..
737 F.3d 238, 238 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 249.
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Chapters 11 and 15, in that “Section 1502 supplants Section 101 – i.e., it
supplants the definition of debtor within the context of Chapter 15.”187
Summarily, though inconclusively, it would seem that a PDVSA
foreign main proceeding would be eligible to seek Chapter 15 relief.
However, given the Court’s statement in In re IRBC, it is unclear whether
such a filing’s eligibility would be entirely uncontested.
B. Challenge #2: Avoiding Dismissal or Limited Relief from U.S.
Courts
An additional set of problems with the recognition of a foreign main
proceeding in Venezuela stems from Venezuela’s insolvency regime. The
weaknesses intrinsic to Venezuela’s insolvency regime could allow U.S.
courts to dismiss such a proceeding entirely, or significantly limit the relief
provided to PDVSA. Section 1522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides
that any relief granted upon filing or recognition of a Chapter 15 case can
“only” be given “if the interests of the creditors and other interested
entities. . . are sufficiently protected.”188 Furthermore, any additional relief
or support from U.S. courts can only be provided if the foreign proceeding
may reasonably assure:
Just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the
debtor’s property; protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in
such foreign proceeding; prevention of preferential or fraudulent
dispositions of property of the debtor; distribution of proceeds of the
debtor’s property substantially in accordance with the order prescribed
by this title . . . .189
Finally, 11 U.S.C. §1506 allows U.S. courts to refuse any “action
governed” by Chapter 15 if such an action were “manifestly contrary to the
public policy of the United States.”190 This means that if “the procedural
fairness of the foreign proceeding is in doubt”191 or if a “‘U.S.
constitutional or statutory right’ is severely impinged,” a U.S. court can
refuse to grant relief in or outright dismiss a Chapter 15 case.192 Could a
Venezuelan foreign proceeding satisfy all these conditions for relief? It
187. Id.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a), (b).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1507.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1506.
191. In re Ir. Bank Resolution Corp. (In Special Liquidation), No. 13-12159 (CSS), at *57
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 30, 2014).
192. Id.
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would certainly face multiple hurdles given the significant deficiencies
inherent to Venezuelan proceedings.193
Venezuela’s insolvency regime is an archaic, liquidation-oriented
system, inadequate for the reorganization of an on-going concern, let alone
one of the size and complexity of PDVSA.194 According to the World
Bank’s Doing Business data sets on Resolving Insolvency, Venezuela’s
insolvency regime ranks among the worst-performing in the world. Of the
167 countries for which there was data,195 Venezuela ranked 165th for its
insolvency regime in the general Resolving Insolvency ranking, 164th on
recovery rates for secured creditors, among the bottom twenty-five
countries in terms of the strength of its insolvency framework, and among
the eighteen worst in terms of the duration of the proceeding.196 This
lackluster performance may be explained, in part, due to the shortcomings
of Venezuela’s insolvency statutes, legal system, and courts.
1. Venezuelan Insolvency Regime
The Venezuelan insolvency regime is codified in the Venezuelan
Commercial Code (“Código de Comercio”),197 Articles 898 through 1081.
If a debtor is unable to pay its obligations as they come due, the
Venezuelan insolvency regime provides for two possible proceedings: 1)
Bankruptcy (“Quiebra”), and (2) Moratorium (“Atraso”). Whether a
debtor is eligible for one or the other depends on a balance sheet test: if a
debtor’s assets in liquidation would be insufficient to pay off all liabilities,
193. Although this Paper assumes the absence of the U.S. sanctions introduced by
Executive Order 13808 (or similar public policy instruments) it is worth noting the risk that
these pose considering 11 U.S.C. § 1506. As written by Cooper and Walker: “the existence
of U.S. sanctions . . . would no doubt be used by opponents to argue that granting Chapter 15
relief to PDVSA would be contrary to U.S. policy. Whether such an argument would be
successful is hard to predict, but at a minimum we believe it would weigh heavily on any
court addressing these issues.” Cooper and Walker, supra note 12, at 20.
194. Pedro Jiménez and Amanda Parra Cristie, supra note 14, at 2; Carlos Acedo Sucre
and Luisa Acedo de Lepervanche, Venezuela: Insolvency Under Venezuelan Law, MONDAQ,
Apr.
11,
2005,
http://www.mondaq.com/x/31915/Credit+Control+Cashflow+Management/Insolvency+Und
er+Venezuelan+Law+; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENTS,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper.
195. Certain countries included in the data sets have no accompanying data and are all
ranked in last place (169th) in the data set’s overall ranking. These countries are: Angola,
Bhutan, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Dem. Rep. Of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Grenada,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Libya, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
South Sudan, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Timor-Leste.
196. See Appendix 6: Doing Business, Resolving Insolvency Rankings.
197. “CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO” [Commercial Code] Gaceta N° 475 Extraordinaria
(December 21, 1955) (Venez.) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/ve/ve029es.pdf.
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then it is eligible for Bankruptcy. If, on the other hand, a debtor’s assets in
liquidation would be sufficient to pay off all liabilities, then it is eligible for
a Moratorium.
The Bankruptcy proceeding is “akin to a liquidation”:198 once a
voluntary or involuntary199 case is recognized by a Venezuelan Commercial
Court, the presiding judge orders the judicial possession of the debtor’s
assets, books, documents, and correspondence and appoints a trustee to
manage and liquidate the debtor on behalf of creditors.200 Although a
debtor may reach agreements with creditors on a unanimous basis at any
moment during the proceeding,201 “bankruptcy is neither a protection nor a
benefit. In the ordinary course of events, bankruptcy leads to the
liquidation of the bankrupt estate.”202 If PDVSA sought to be restructured
and rehabilitated (rather than simply liquidated), this does not seem to be a
proper option to be considered.
The Moratorium, on the other hand, does entertain a more viable
option for reaching agreements with creditors. Once a Venezuelan
Commercial Court recognizes a Moratorium (which can only be initiated
voluntarily),203 the debtor may be given up to twelve months204 to either pay
off all of its debts or reach an agreement with its creditors. During this
period, the debtor remains in possession of its assets and management,205
and enjoys relief in the form of an automatic stay against any prepetition
unsecured or non-privileged claim.206 In addition, the Moratorium does
contain a cramdown provision, in which an agreement binding all creditors

198. Pedro Jiménez and Amanda Parra Cristie, supra note 14, at 2.
199. Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated by either the debtor, one or more creditors,
or Venezuelan Commercial Courts. CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [COMMERCIAL Code] art. 907, 911,
913, 914, 924, 925, 932.
200. Id. art. 937, 939, 940.
201. Id. art. 1009.
202. BAKER MCKENZIE, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE 466 (2016).
203. CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO[COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 898.
204. This period may be extended for up to another twelve months if creditors
representing at least 50% of unpaid liabilities agree to an extension. Id. art. 908.
205. Per articles 898, 900, 902, 903, and 904 of the Venezuelan Commercial Code,
“debtors continue to operate and administer their day-to-day business within the scope of the
plan for liquidating outstanding debts. Nevertheless, the court imposes several restrictions on
the debtor in respect of the management and disposition of its assets. The debtor must obtain
prior approval of the court to sell, pledge, mortgage, borrow money, compromise, collect
receivables, make payments or perform any other acts which are necessary for the purposes
of liquidating its assets and satisfying its creditors. The debtor is also subject to supervision
by the creditors’ committee. In addition, under certain exceptional circumstances, the debtor
also may be completely deprived by the court of the management of its business.” BAKER
MCKENZIE, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE, 465 (2016).
206. CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO[COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 905.
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may be passed with the support of creditors representing 75% of the
debtor’s liabilities.
Although the Moratorium seems promising as a court supervised
insolvency proceeding that confers a debtor with relief and a negotiating
forum, it is still a highly imperfect scheme. Principally, the Moratorium is
remarkably rudimentary.
The process by which a debtor may reach an agreement with its
creditors is entirely contained in Article 906 of the Venezuelan
Commercial Code, which reads as follows:207
During the amicable liquidation, the debtor may enter with its
creditors into any other arrangement or agreement that grants it
extensions on its moratorium; and even reductions in interests and
part of the principal; but in order for it to be valid, it will require
the approval of all creditors.
[An agreement] could also be validly established by a majority of
creditors representing, at a minimum, three fourths of the
liabilities, so long as the creditors agreeing with the debtor agree
on and ensure the means of addressing the results of any dispute
with dissenting creditors, so that dissenting creditors are assured
to recover what they could otherwise receive, according to their
respective rights, from a prudently administered liquidation.
A copy of the agreement shall in all cases be given to the Court,
and if the agreement has received unanimous approval from
creditors, the Court shall so declare it so that the agreement may
produce all of its effects.
If only the indicated majority is reached, the Court will judge in
oral proceedings all dissents, if they pertain to any right held by
the respective party that was denied and damaged by the
agreement, after hearing the creditor’s committee; and its decision
may only be appealed208 in the Superior Courts. But if the dissents
do not pertain to disputed rights, the Court will limit itself to
verifying the majority; and having heard the creditor’s committee,
will approve the agreement. 209
207. Given that I have not been able to find an official English translation of the
Commercial Code, all translations referring to this Document are my own. Wherever a
translation is made, the original passage in Spanish will be referenced in an accompanying
footnote.
208. Initiating an appeal does not suspend enforcement of the commercial court’s
judgement.
209. “Durante la liquidación amigable podrá el deudor celebrar con sus acreedores
cualquier otro arreglo o convenio que le conceda mayores moratorias; y aun quitas de intereses
y hasta de parte de los capitales; pero para que tenga validez necesitará el acuerdo de todos
los acreedores.
También podrá establecerse válidamente con la sola mayoría de los acreedores que
representen, por lo menos, las tres cuartas partes del pasivo, con tal que los acreedores que
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Thus, with the approval of the court, the debtor may reach agreements
binding on all creditors with the support of creditors representing 75% of
its liabilities. The agreement may extend its moratoriums, reduce interest
and/or reduce principal owed. That is the full extent of the framework
governing agreements: there is no mention of voting by creditor classes, no
mention of how claims held by insiders or related parties210 are to be
treated, nor any mention of how a creditor’s claims may be protected if it
has appealed the commercial court’s recognition of an agreement.
Additionally, the Moratorium fails to contemplate how the insolvency
of more than one entity of a corporate group may be addressed. There are
no provisions for any forms of joint administration, substantive
consolidation (nor deemed or partial), or any other manner of
comprehensive corporate group proceeding. Given the intercompany
guarantees of PDVSA’s liabilities (see Appendices 4 and 5), this is a
relevant consideration. The prospect that a restructuring of PDVSA’s
liabilities may unravel into multiple, separate, and independent proceedings
would not be auspicious for either PDVSA or its creditors.
A final point on the Moratorium is that, perhaps, it may not even be
available to PDVSA. Recall that in order to be eligible for a Moratorium
proceeding, a debtor’s assets in a liquidation must exceed its liabilities.
Even if a Moratorium is initially recognized, the presiding judge could
convert a Moratorium into a Bankruptcy proceeding at any point if there is
any indication that the debtor’s assets will be incapable of fully offsetting
its liabilities.211 Given that all of PDVSA’s publicly traded bonds are
currently trading at a discount (the highest at 90.2, the lowest at 39.3),212
what would prevent a judge from converting a Moratorium to a
Bankruptcy, or from outright dismissing a Moratorium petition?
convengan con el deudor, acuerden y aseguren el medio de atender al resultado de toda
controversia con los disidentes, de modo que quede a éstos asegurada la parte que realmente
pudieran sacar de la liquidación practicada prudentemente según sus respectivos derechos.
Del convenio se pasará copia en todo caso al Tribunal, y si él ha obtenido el voto de la
unanimidad de los acreedores, el Tribunal lo declarará así para que produzca todos sus efectos.
Si sólo se reúne la mayoría indicada, el Tribunal decidirá en juicio verbal las disidencias, si
ellas versan sobre algún derecho sostenido por el interesado respectivo y negado y dañado en
el convenio, oída la comisión de acreedores; y de su decisión sólo se oirá apelación en un solo
efecto y para ante el Tribunal Superior. Pero si no versan sobre los derechos disputados, el
Tribunal se limitará a verificar la mayoría; y oída la comisión, aprobará el convenio.”
210. For example, the Venezuelan State and its related public sector entities, such as the
Venezuelan Central Bank, Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank, state-owned
commercial banks, or other SOEs.
211. CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 907.
212. See Lucas Jullian, Grasping at Straws: Exploring PDVSA’s Access to Debtor Relief
Under Restructuring Regimes, 57 (June 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law) (discussing PDVSA bond trading
patterns).
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2. Venezuelan Legal System and Commercial Courts
The second critical weakness of a potential Venezuelan insolvency
proceeding is the current quality and performance of Venezuela’s legal
system. As perhaps expected from a court-supervised proceeding,
Venezuelan commercial courts and their judges play a very active role in
Moratoriums and Bankruptcies. Though not exhaustive, the following list
enumerates the extensive powers and responsibilities of commercial courts
in the context of a Moratorium:
(1) recognize or deny a debtor’s petition of a Moratorium proceeding;
(2) establish duration of the Moratorium;
(3) establish the protective measures and precautions that it deems
necessary to ensure the integrity of the debtor’s assets;
(4) appoint creditors that will compose the creditor’s committee,
which will have oversight over the management and liquidation of
the debtor’s assets;
(5) “authorize the following acts: selling assets, granting securities,
contracting debts, settling court cases, collecting or paying debts
and other acts which are deemed necessary for the purposes of the
liquidation”;213
(6) recognize agreements between a debtor and its creditors if it
counts with unanimous support from creditors;
(7) approve agreements between a debtor and its creditors if such an
agreement is not unanimously backed by creditors, but counts
with the support of creditors representing at least 75% of the
debtor’s liabilities;
(8) judge dissents against the plan; and
(9) decide whether to convert a Moratorium proceeding into a
Bankruptcy proceeding at any time if (1) liabilities are discovered
that the debtor had not initially disclosed, (2) if assets declared by
the debtor are found to not exist, (3) if the debtor does not satisfy
the obligations and conditions that were imposed upon it
regarding the management and liquidation of its assets, (4) if the
debtor is guilty of fraud or acting in bad faith, or (5) if the debtor’s
assets are insufficient to pay off its liabilities, or at least two thirds
of them.214

213. Carlos Acedo Sucre and Luisa Acedo de Lepervanche, Venezuela: Insolvency Under
Venezuelan Law, MONDAQ, Apr. 11, 2005, referencing “CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO”
[COMMERCIAL Code] art. 904.
214. CÓDIGO DE COMERCIO [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 898, 903, 906, 907, 911.
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In a Bankruptcy proceeding, the Court is granted even greater powers:
as previously mentioned, the court takes possession of the debtor and
appoints a trustee to liquidate its assets.215 Given this degree of
involvement, the quality of Venezuelan commercial courts is a crucial
element when evaluating a Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding. The
problem is, Venezuela’s courts and legal system leave much to be desired
judging by the assessments of international observers.
According to the World Justice Project, Venezuela ranks last in the
Rule of Law Index, which analyzes the legal systems of 113 countries
across multiple categories.216 Although Venezuela ranks last or close to
last across all categories, it is noteworthy to highlight its ranking in
categories that seem relevant in the context of a PDVSA proceeding. For
example, Venezuela ranks last in Constraints on Government Powers,217
103rd on Absence of Corruption, last in Regulatory Enforcement,218 and
112th in Civil Justice.219 Transparency International, for its part, ranks
Venezuela 169th of 180 in its 2017 Corruptions Perceptions Index.220
Finally, the World Bank’s Doing Business project ranks Venezuela 147th of
190 in its Enforcing Contracts ranking, and places Venezuela among the 71
worst performing countries in its Quality of Judicial Processes index.221
Regarding insolvency proceedings in particular, Venezuelan judges
tend to lack the experience, resources and infrastructure to manage

215. Id. art. 937, 939, 940.
216. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX: VENEZUELA, 2017-2018,
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/VEN (last visited March 06, 2018).
217. Considers if government powers are effectively limited by the (1) legislature, (2)
judiciary, and/or (3) independent auditing and review. Also considers (4) if government
officials are sanctioned for misconduct, (5) if government powers are subject to nongovernmental checks, and (6) if transition of power is subject to the law.
218. Measures if (1) government regulations are effectively enforced, (2) if government
regulations are applied and enforced without improper influence, (3) administrative
proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delay, (4) due process is respected in
administrative proceedings, and (5) the government does not expropriate without lawful
process and adequate compensation.
219. Measures if (1) people can access and afford civil justice; if (2) civil justice is free
of discrimination, (3) free of corruption, (4) free of improper government influence, (5) is not
subject to unreasonable delay, (6) is effectively enforced; and if (7) ADR is accessible,
impartial, and effective.
220. TRANSPERANCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2016, (Feb. 15,
2018),
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2017
(last visited March 6, 2018).
BANK,
ENFORCING
CONTRACTS,
221. WORLD
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts.
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insolvency proceedings, leading to results that are “frequently
disappointing for the Creditors and very damaging to the Debtor.”222
With these assessments in mind, would a U.S. bankruptcy court
recognize a Venezuelan foreign main proceeding involving an entity as
important and close to the State and country of Venezuela as PDVSA?
Could it reasonably believe that such a proceeding would be fair, involve
due process, feature a “distribution” similar to the “order prescribed” by the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and generally be in the interest of “creditors and
other interested parties”? Since 2015, the U.S. Department of State has
observed that “Venezuela’s bankruptcy laws are outdated and inadequate to
permit the reorganization of a debtor as a going concern.”223 To what
extent would a U.S. bankruptcy court agree or disagree with such an
opinion?
Thus, a PDVSA foreign main proceeding under Venezuela’s
insolvency regime would not only have to deal with the issue of eligibility,
but also with the deficiencies of Venezuela’s insolvency statutes and legal
system. As was the case of seeking relief under a plenary Chapter 11
proceeding, seeking relief under Chapter 15 would constitute a challenging
and contentious endeavor.
IV.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Although a U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding or a Venezuelan foreign main
proceeding (coupled with Chapter 15 recognition) seemed to be the most
appropriate venues by which PDVSA could seek debtor relief, they are
unfortunately fraught with considerable legal obstacles. Even if those
challenges could be ultimately overcome, they could nonetheless incite
legal challenges to be presented by creditors opposed to or seeking leverage
over PDVSA.
The difficulties and contentious elements of both options thus invites
the question: are there any other alternatives that would allow PDVSA to
circumvent these issues? Could anything be modified so as to allow
PDVSA access to debtor relief, either under American, Venezuelan, or
other restructuring regimes? As an exercise of contemplating different
alternatives, three other cases will be briefly considered:
(1) Foreign Non-Main Proceeding & Ancillary Chapter 15
Recognition,

222. Acedo Sucre and Acedo de Lepervanche, supra note 213.
223. U.S. Department of State, supra note 194.
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(2) Venezuelan Foreign Main Proceeding & Ancillary Chapter 15
Recognition, After Modifying PDVSA Legal Regime and
Venezuelan Insolvency Regime, and
(3) the Amendment of Governing Law & Jurisdiction of U.S.
Liabilities.
A. Foreign Non-Main Proceeding & Ancillary Chapter 15
Recognition
What if PDVSA, rather than seeking Chapter 15 recognition of a
Venezuelan proceeding, instead sought recognition of a foreign non-main
proceeding under another restructuring regime and jurisdiction more
palatable to U.S. courts? Would such a strategy provide PDVSA with a
better chance of recognition and relief in the United States?
While such a course of action may avoid problems stemming from
Venezuela’s insolvency regime and legal system, it unfortunately would do
nothing to address the issue of eligibility. Changing the regime and
jurisdiction of a PDVSA proceeding would not alter PDVSA’s relationship
with the Venezuelan State, and therefore would not improve PDVSA’s
ability to comply with 11 U.S.C §109(a). Thus, this strategy is unlikely to
be an effective alternative to a plenary Chapter 11 proceeding or a
Venezuelan foreign main proceeding recognized under an ancillary Chapter
15 filing.
B. Venezuelan Foreign Main Proceeding & Ancillary Chapter 15
Recognition, After Modifying PDVSA Legal Regime and
Venezuelan Insolvency Regime
As mentioned in the previous case, PDVSA may be unable to seek
relief in the United States under any kind of proceeding, initiated anywhere
in the world, if it does not comply with the definition of “person” in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Thus, could Venezuela alter its relationship with
PDVSA in order to comply with §109(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code?
Furthermore, what if Venezuela modified its insolvency regime so as to
satisfy U.S. courts’ expectations of a foreign proceeding meriting
recognition and relief?
Considering the numerous actions that would have to be undertaken
by Venezuela and the very generous assumptions on the granting of comity
by U.S. courts, it would be fair to characterize this path as an academic
exercise. At a minimum, such a scenario would require:
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(1) the passing of legitimate reforms to Venezuela’s laws, including
the Venezuelan Constitution, Commercial Code, Organic Law of
Hydrocarbons, and PDVSA’s Articles of Incorporation and
Corporate Statutes;224
(2) evidence suggesting that PDVSA’s management and day-to-day
operations are not directed by the Venezuelan State (thus
distancing PDVSA from the influence of the executive branch);
(3) guarantees or other indications that would allow a U.S. court to
confidently believe that a proceeding under a new Venezuelan
insolvency regime would be fair and in good faith; and
(4) a proceeding in which either (a) the absolute priority rule is not
egregiously violated (implying Venezuela would not be
guaranteed an interest in PDVSA while dissenting creditors
remained impaired) or (b) a U.S. court willing to provide relief
despite a violation of the absolute priority rule (which would be
the case if the Venezuelan State were guaranteed any interest in a
restructured PDVSA despite the dissent of impaired creditor
classes).
These are, of course, significant and complex departures from current
circumstances. For the sake of argument, however, it should be noted that
Venezuela’s legal regime has historically been quite malleable. Since its
independence, Venezuela has had twenty-six constitutions—and may be in
the process of developing yet another (despite political opposition).225
Additionally, although PDVSA has been wholly owned by the Venezuelan
State since its incorporation, its relationship to the Venezuelan State has
not always been as “symbio[tic]”226 as it has been since 2003.227 These
observations are not meant to minimize the highly unlikely nature of this
224. Clearly a challenge given the current state of politics and conflict between branches
of government. See Jose Orozco and Fabiola Zerpa, Venezuela Opposition Calls New Protests
as
Death
Toll
Mounts,
BLOOMBERG,
April
24,
2017,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-25/venezuela-s-opposition-calls-newprotest-as-death-toll-mounts (discussing the reinvigorated plans of Venezuela’s opposition
party)
225. Nathan Crooks and Fabiola Zerpa, Why Venezuela May Change It’s Constitution for
May
9,
2017,
the
27th
Time,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-09/why-venezuela-may-get-its-27thconstitution-quicktake-q-a.
226. Moody’s Investors Service, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.: Credit Opinion, pg. 1.
227. Bernard Mommer, Petróleo Subversivo, in LA POLÍTICA VENEZOLANA EN LA ÉPOCA
DE CHÁVEZ: CLASES, POLARIZACIÓN Y CONFLICTO, 167-185 (Steve Ellner and Daniel
Hellinger ed., Serra Rojas and Marireyna trans, 2003); see Venezuela’s oil diaspora: Brain
haemorrhage,
THE
ECONOMIST,
July
19,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21607824-venezuelas-loss-thousands-oilworkers-has-been-other-countries-gain-brain-haemorrhage,” (arguing that PDVSA has not
always had a harmonious relationship with the Venezeulan State).

916

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV

scenario, but rather to note that it may yet pertain to the realm of the
possible.
C. Amend Governing Law & Jurisdiction of U.S. Liabilities
Given the extraordinary measures Venezuela and PDVSA would have
to undertake to unquestionably assuage U.S. statutes and courts — is there
any alternative by which PDVSA could circumvent the need for U.S.
recognition altogether? For example, could this be achieved by amending
the governing law and jurisdiction provisions of its U.S liabilities228 to a
legal system whose statutes, courts, and restructuring regime are more
amenable to an entity in PDVSA’s circumstances? It may be worthwhile to
consider such a scenario under English law and making use of the English
scheme of arrangement (scheme) to restructure PDVSA’s liabilities.
The reasons to contemplate such an alternative are threefold. First,
the English scheme is comparable in sophistication and effectiveness to the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11. Though different in substantial
aspects, they are both considered the “most attractive forums in which to
promulgate the restructuring of a multinational corporate group.”229 Unlike
Chapter 11, a scheme is “not necessarily an insolvency procedure,”230 and
does not provide debtors with an equally expansive set of tools or relief.231
It does, however, provide a cramdown mechanism232 and, crucially for
PDVSA, greater flexibility when it comes to debtor eligibility. In order to
be eligible to make use of a scheme, a debtor needs only to establish a
“sufficient connection” with England.233 In In Re Rodenstock GmbH, the
presiding English court found that a “sufficient connection” was constituted
by the choice of English law in a credit document’s governing law
provision.234 Thus, if PDVSA’s liabilities were governed by English law,
they could potentially be restructured under a scheme.
This leads us to the second point of this scenario: there is already
precedent for a firm amending the governing law and jurisdiction
provisions of its liabilities from New York law to English law for the
explicit purpose of restructuring them under a scheme. In 2015, DTEK
Finance BV (a Dutch subsidiary of a Ukrainian power company)
228. For example, its U.S. dollar-denominated secured and unsecured bonds.
229. Zacaroli QC and Riddiford, supra note 119, at 6.
230. Id. at 6-7.
231. Id. at 6.
232. A scheme is deemed to be approved when creditors representing at least 75% of
claims in value, and at least 50% in number in each class participating in the scheme vote
favorably.
233. [2011]EWHC (Ch) 1104 68 (U.K.).
234. Id.
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restructured its senior notes governed by New York law by amending its
governing law and jurisdiction, and subsequently executing a scheme.235
Because the notes did not explicitly specify the majority required to change
the notes’ governing law and jurisdiction provisions, DTEK’s legal counsel
argued that a simple majority would suffice to change them. This was
further supported by former Judge James M. Peck,236 who provided expert
evidence to the English court presiding over the scheme.237 PDVSA’s
notes, likewise, do not explicitly state the kind of majority required to
amend their governing law and jurisdiction provisions. The English court,
for its part, found that “the change of governing law to English law should
be treated as a sufficient connection with this court.”238
Critically, by changing the law and jurisdiction governing the notes
away from New York law, it seems DTEK avoided the need to initiate a
U.S. proceeding altogether. For a point of comparison, consider what
transpired when DTEK carried out a different scheme in 2016 (the “LTR
Scheme”), modifying — among other liabilities — senior notes governed
by New York law. This time around, DTEK did pursue Chapter 15
recognition of the scheme. According to DTEK’s legal counsel, the filing
of an ancillary Chapter 15 case was instigated by the fact that a New York
law-governed instrument was being affected by a scheme. Per the legal
counsel: “as [the notes] were governed by New York law, DTEK also filed
a petition for the recognition of the LTR Scheme sanction order under
Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.”239 Thus, considering what
transpired in each of these two schemes, it seems that as long as PDVSA
does not affect New York law-governed liabilities by a scheme, it may
perhaps be able to avoid seeking recognition in the United States.
The third reason to consider such a scenario is that, in important
contrast to eligibility under U.S. proceedings, it seems that PDVSA’s status
as an SOE may not be an impediment for being able to restructure its
liabilities via a scheme. In 2013, the Vietnamese Shipbuilding Industry
Group (Vinashin),240 a SOE wholly owned by the Government of Vietnam,
235. John Houghton, David Stewart and Vanessa Morrison, The DTEK Scheme: A New
Way to Restructure US Law Bonds, LATHAM WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENTARy, (May 5,
2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-the-dtek-scheme.
236. Former United States Bankruptcy Judge in the Southern District of New York.
237. Houghton, Stewart and Morrison, supra note 235.
238. In the Matter of DTEK Finance B.V., [2015] EWHC (Ch) 1164 16 (U.K.).
239. John Houghton, Margaret S. Fong and Vanessa Morrison, The DTEK Restructuring
— The Final Chapter, LATHAM WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENTARY, April 27, 2017.
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/DTEK-restructuring-final-chapter.
240. As part of the Vietnamese government’s efforts to restructure Vinashin, Vietnam’s
Ministry of Transport created the Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (SBIC) to take charge of
the restructuring of Vinashin and its companies. SBIC will continue the rights, legal
obligations, and interest of Vinashin. SBIC was founded as a Single Member Limited
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successfully made use of the scheme to restructure and bind all creditors of
a US$600 million facility governed by English law.241 Considering
PDVSA’s potential use of a scheme, there are a few notable elements of
this case that should be highlighted. First, the nature of Vinashin’s
relationship with the Vietnamese State seems to have played no role in the
analysis carried out by the court when sanctioning Vinashin’s scheme.242
Second, Vinashin’s legal and financial advisors expressed that Vinashin’s
decision to restructure the facility under a scheme was partially motivated
by the comparable unattractiveness of Vietnam’s bankruptcy laws.243
Third, even though Vinashin had no assets or operations in the United
Kingdom, and that none of its creditors were in England,244 the court was of
the “view that the fact that the loan agreement is governed by English law
is of itself sufficient to create that necessary connection.”245 Fourth,
although a scheme proceeding does not provide an automatic stay against
creditor litigation, the court did provide a stay against two lenders seeking
repayment of outstanding principal and interest due on the US$600 million
facility.246
Liability Company whose 100 percent stake is held by the government and is under the direct
management of the Ministry of Transport, and the Minister of Transport is fully authorized to
assign its chief officials. See Establishment of the Shipbuilding Industry, SHIPBUILDING
INDUSTRY CORPORATION (Oct. 31, 2013), http://sbic.com.vn/News/Establishment-of-theShipbuilding-Industry-Corporation-SBIC.html?p=158&id=1570 (discussing the ownership
structure of the Shipbuilding Industry Corporation).
241. When Vinashin defaulted on its debts, it had total liabilities of US$4.6 billion. See
Jonathan Leitch, Vietnamese Restructuring Using an English Scheme of Arrangement, DLA
PIPER
PUBLICATIONS
(Dec.
12,
2013),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2013/12/vietnamese-restructuringusing-an-english-scheme__/ (discussing whether English Courts had jurisdiction to wind up
Vinashin).
242. Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group, [2013] EWHC (Ch) 2476 (U.K.).
243. Leitch, supra note 241; Devi Shah and Jessica Walker, First Scheme of Arrangement
for a Vietnamese Company is Sanctioned, MAYER BROWN LEGAL UPDATE (Sept. 5, 2013),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/First-Scheme-of-Arrangement-for-a-Vietnamese-Companyis-Sanctioned-09-05-2013/; and Phil Smith, Ha Do and Eddie Middleton, Vinashin Stays
Afloat—Ground Breaking English Scheme Approved for a Vietnamese Restructuring, KPMG
RESTRUCTURING
NEWSLETTER
(Oct.
4,
2013),
https://home.kpmg.com/cn/en/home/insights/2013/09/restructuring-newsletter-130903.html. Vietnam’s insolvency regime was ranked 125th in the World Bank’s Doing Business
Resolving Insolvency ranking. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s insolvency regimes are
ranked 13th and Venezuela’s 165th. THE WORLD BANK, Resolving Insolvency, DOING BUSINESS
(June
2017),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency
(Accessed March 6, 2018) (showing ).
244. Shah and Walker, , supra note 243.
245. Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group, at 9 (discussing the facts and benefits of
Vinashin utilizing an English scheme of arrangement).
246. Tom Smith, Moratoriums and Schemes of Arrangement, SOUTH SQUARE DIGEST
(August 2013), http://www.southsquare.com/files/SSD-issue-20-Aug-13.pdf; see Shah and
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Although this restructuring alternative seems promising as a path
by which to address obstacles posed by U.S. statutes and courts to a
PDVSA proceeding, it is not without its own set of challenges or
potentially litigious elements. First, it is unclear whether the governing law
and jurisdiction provisions of a New York law-governed contract could be
amended by a simple majority, or if it would require a higher threshold of
participation. When DTEK pursued its first scheme, it was challenged by
Alden Global Capital (a hedge fund investing in DTEK’s notes), which
argued that “the change of governing law needed more than 90% consent
because it would impair the rights of creditors to bring enforcement
proceedings.”247 The court, however, never had to provide an opinion on
this matter, as DTEK’s scheme ultimately received the approval of 91.1%
of its noteholders, leading Alden Global Capital to withdraw the
challenge.248 Beyond the matter of the specific threshold to be overcome, it
seems that this may be a point for litigation.
A second issue is that, if PDVSA sought to restructure its New York
law-governed liabilities in a single scheme without recognition in U.S.
courts, it would first have to amend those liabilities individually, gaining
sufficient creditor consent to amend them on a series by series basis. This
means that if dissenting creditors wished to prevent their security from
being restructured under a scheme in this context, they could do so by
acquiring the minimum participation necessary to block an amendment to
the governing law and jurisdiction provisions. As mentioned in the
previous point, it is unclear whether such a minimum stake would be 10%
or 50% of an issuance.
A third issue is that, even if PDVSA may not have to or may not wish
to seek recognition of a scheme in the United States via an ancillary
Chapter 15 case, it may nonetheless have to prove that a scheme would be
enforceable in the United States. Even though DTEK did not petition
Chapter 15 recognition of its first scheme, the English court presiding the
scheme proceeding noted that:
[C]ourts have . . . always needed assurance that the Scheme will
have a practical effect . . . so far as the New York courts are
concerned, the legal advice received by DTEK is that relief to
prevent actions in conflict with the terms of the approved Scheme
will be readily obtainable either as a matter of comity or because
it is DTEK’s intention to register the Scheme under Chapter 15 of
Walker, supra note 243 (discussing English Courts jurisdiction to stay actions brought against
a debtor).
247. Tom Young, DTEK Shifts High-Yield Restructuring Options, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW (May 20, 2015), https://www.lw.com/mediaCoverage/dtekrestructuring.
248. Id.
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the US Bankruptcy Code.249

In fact, when DTEK sought to counter challenges to its scheme with
expert evidence from Judge Peck, part of DTEK’s argument relied on
“extensive precedents . . . that a US federal court or New York state court
would: (a) extend comity to the judgement approving the Scheme; and (b)
grant Chapter 15 recognition of the Scheme based on DTEK’s COMI . . . in
England.”250 In an article reviewing DTEK’s first scheme, Linklaters
observed that “increasing the probability that a US court would both
recognize and afford injunctive and other relief in support of a UK
scheme . . . is also likely to assist the English court in exercising its
discretion whether to take jurisdiction or sanction a scheme in the first
instance.”251 Linklaters goes on to highlight a case when a debtor sought to
explicitly rule out the need for Chapter 15 recognition:
[A]t the convening hearing for the Zlomrex scheme . . . Mann J
expressed ‘misgivings’ about the inclusion of wording in the
scheme which enabled the company . . . to waive a condition to
implementation of the scheme that it seek Chapter 15 recognition.
Although he did not insist on its removal and duly convened the
relevant creditor meetings, his concern was that the English court
might give ‘the impression of blithely overriding New York law
rights and any legitimate interests of the New York court.’252
Thus, even if PDVSA does not seek recognition of a scheme in the
United States, would it have to prove to an English court that such a
scheme would be granted comity under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code? If PDVSA were forced to do so — despite carrying out a scheme
that only sought to restructure liabilities amended to be governed by
English law — then PDVSA once again may be unable to escape the
challenges of seeking recognition from U.S. courts under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. And this, of course, is prior to any other issue that may
be raised by English judges when evaluating an attempt by PDVSA to
make use of English law and courts.
It is important to note that if PDVSA sought to change the governing
law and jurisdiction provisions of its U.S. liabilities, it could propose to
change them to those of any other state or country on the planet.
Ultimately, amending these provisions relies on receiving sufficient support
from creditors — creditors which, in turn, would likely seek sufficient
249. In the Matter of DTEK Finance, EWHC (Ch) 1164 at 19.
250. Houghton, Stewart, and Morrison, supra note 235, at 3.
251. Linklaters, DTEK Exchange Offer and Scheme of Arrangement: Faciitating High3
(May
2015),
Yield
Debt
Restructurings,
LINKLATERS
file:///Users/aday/Downloads/Combined_DTEK_alert.pdf
252. Id.
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confidence and comfort in the governing law and jurisdictions proposed.
English law has been used as an example in this particular case due to the
proven sophistication, robustness, and flexibility of its restructuring regime.
Although PDVSA would not be confined to English law if it pursued this
strategy, it would still need to propose a law and jurisdiction acceptable to
creditors.
CONCLUSION
PDVSA and its sole shareholder, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, are currently facing daunting levels of financial and economic
distress. As reflected by the prices of their publicly traded bonds, their
seemingly dire circumstances have incited speculation on their ability to
service their obligations, prompting scholars, credit-rating agencies, and
capital market participants to ponder the likelihood, manner, and
implications of their potential defaults. An element of this discussion is
whether PDVSA may be able to restructure its liabilities by utilizing debtor
relief mechanisms from pertinent restructuring regimes.
An assessment of PDVSA’s assets, operations, and liabilities signals
that the most apparent restructuring strategies contemplating debtor relief
would, in order to be effective, require recognition from U.S. courts.
Unfortunately, PDVSA’s relationship with the Venezuelan State, along
with the condition of Venezuela’s legal system, present extraordinary
challenges for PDVSA’s access to or recognition of debtor relief in the
United States. The pursuit of any strategy requiring the actual or
hypothetical satisfaction of U.S. statutes and courts would thus likely be
contentious, eliciting legal reactions from dissenting creditors. Alternative
strategies — such as changing PDVSA’s relationship to the state or
amending its liabilities so as to avoid U.S. courts — may fail to prove any
less litigious, impractical, or inviable. And this is without even taking into
account sanctions and other public policy instruments that additionally
complicate or hinder PDVSA’s access to restructuring alternatives.
Even if the strategies contemplated in this paper were ultimately
legally available to PDVSA, they would still require considerable levels of
creditor consent in order to be successful.253 This may raise a question of
253. Under a plenary U.S Chapter 11 proceeding, PDVSA would require the support of
creditors representing at least two-thirds of claims in amount, and more than one half in
number across all impaired classes (this assumes Venezuela would seek to maintain its equity
interest in PDVSA and thus, per the absolute priority rule, would not be able to cram a plan
on dissenting impaired creditors). Under a Venezuelan Moratorium, PDVSA would require
the support of creditors representing 75% of claims in value across all of PDVSA’s liabilities.
Under an English scheme of arrangement, PDVSA would require the support of creditors
representing 75% of claims in amount, and 50% in number in each class affected by the
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whether pursuing formal debtor relief (e.g. stay on creditor litigation or
cramdown provision) would be worth the trouble. Given the high levels of
creditor support required to effectively use any of the alternatives explored,
could PDVSA not simply avoid default via voluntary mechanisms
supported by the same kind of percentage of creditors that would otherwise
be required of court-sanctioned restructuring regimes?
If the unremarkable outcome of PDVSA’s 2016 voluntary bond swap
is any indication, it would be reasonable to be skeptical about the feasibility
of averting default on completely voluntary agreements. Considering the
terms offered and threats extended by PDVSA to its creditors, the 2016
bond swap exemplified PDVSA’s creditors’ ability to tolerate risk, 254
overlook incentives, and remain unmoved by the prospect of default.255
proposed scheme.
254. Steve Johnson, Venezuela Investors Undeterred by Near-Certain Default, FINANCIAL
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0231dfca-4553-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996.
255. For PDVSA’s announcements on the 2016 bond swap, see Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A.,
Anuncio
de
Prensa,
(September
16,
2016),
http://www.pdvsa.com/templates/pdvsa/img/bonos/bonopdvsa2017/Anuncio%20de%20Pren
sa%20(PDF).PDF (Accessed May 4, 2017); Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Extensión de la
Fecha
de
Vencimiento
Temprana,
(October
6,
2016),
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/bonos/extensiondelafechadevencimientotemprana.pdf
(Accessed June 14, 2017); Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 2da. Extensión de la Fecha de
Vencimiento
Temprana,
(October
12,
2016),
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/bonos/2daextensiondelafechadevencimienotemprana.pdf
(Accesssed June 14, 2017); Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., 3era. Extensión de la Fecha de
Vencimiento
Temprana,
(October
17,
2016),
http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/bonos/3raextensiondelafechadevencimientotemprana.pdf
(Accessed June 14, 2017); Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Final Announcements, (October 24,
2016)
http://www.pdvsa.com/templates/pdvsa/img/bonos/bonopdvsa2017/Final%20announcement
s%20(PDF).PDF (Accessed June 14, 2017). For media coverage of the swap and its outcome,
see Eric Platt and Jessica Dye, Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Group Debt Swap Flounders,
FINANCIAL TIMES (October 10, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e9e18bac-8caa-11e6-8aa5f79f5696c731?mhq5j=e1; Robin Wigglesworth and Andres Schipani, Venezuelan Oil
Major’s Debt Swap: The Beginning of the End, FINANCIAL TIMES (September 26, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/aadf657c-7f4a-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4?mhq5j=e1; Eric Platt
and Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela’s PDVSA Raises Stakes in Bond Swap, FINANCIAL TIMES
(October 18,2006), https://www.ft.com/content/10eca952-9548-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582;
Jonathan Wheatley and Eric Platt, What Now for Venezuela’s PDVSA After the Bond Swap,
FINANCIAL TIMES (October 25, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e5298570-9a96-11e68f9b-70e3cabccfae?mhq5j=e1; Christine Jenkins and Ben Bartenstein, PDVSA Debt Swap
Plan Gets Early Thumbs Down From Investors, BLOOMBERG (September 19, 2016, 8:33AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-19/pdvsa-debt-swap-proposal-getsearly-thumbs-down-from-investors; Sebastian Boyd and Nathan Crooks, Venezuela’s PDVSA
Sows Payment Doubts While Extending Swap, BLOOMBERG (October 17, 2016, 11:14PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-18/venezuela-extends-bond-swapdeadline-for-third-time-to-oct-21; Johanna Bennett, Venezuela Oilco PDVSA: Bond Swap
(October
26,
2016,
12:45PM),
Buys
Time,
BARRON’S
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Voluntary exchanges, however, may nonetheless remain the only clear,
uncontestable mechanism by which to restructure PDVSA’s debts.
Unfortunately, even voluntary exchanges are temporarily impracticable, as
U.S. sanctions in force as of the writing of this paper prohibit U.S. persons
from partaking in such a transaction.256
Thus, those interested in, affected by, or wagering on PDVSA’s
financial future, would do well to prioritize preparing for out-of-court
voluntary negotiations on one hand, and understand the implications of
default on the other. There are, of course, scenarios in which PDVSA may
avoid becoming insolvent or requiring debtor relief.257 Though
stakeholders may hope for the best, they should also be prepared for the
worst: PDSVA’s potential incapability, or unwillingness, to pay for its
obligations.
Beyond PDVSA’s specific predicament, the issues touched upon in
this paper may also provide some lessons for other SOEs or quasisovereign entities contemplating the issuance of debt in the capital markets.
Given the potential difficulties stemming from the U.S Bankruptcy Code’s
provisions on eligibility and recognition, and the expansive powers of U.S.
courts to dismiss cases or limit relief, SOEs should consider issuing debt
governed by the laws of jurisdictions more amenable to state-owned or
quasi-sovereign entities. Alternatively, such issuers may wish to consider
including more flexible amendment provisions in their future indentures,
such as Collective Action Clauses (CACs.)258 Planning for default may
understandably not be at the top of mind of issuers or their sovereign
http://www.barrons.com/articles/venezuelas-pdvsa-bond-swap-buys-it-time-to-muddlethrough-1477413923; and Mark Walker and Jill Dauchy, Restructuring Venezuelan Debt,
THE
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(November
14,
2016),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/14/restructuring-venezuelan-debt/.
256. Exec. Order No. 13808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,115 (August 24, 2017).
257. Perhaps increases in oil price or other improvements in operations would allow it to
meet its obligations. Perhaps it could effectively continue defraying obligations via voluntary
exchanges or other forms of liability-management transactions. (See Brian Ellsworth, Corina
Pons, and Marianna Parraga, Venezuela’s PDVSA Quietly Issues New Debt to Pay Off
Suppliers, REUTERS (May 3, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economyexclusive-idUSKCN0XU1HL (discussing various securities offerings made by PDVSA).
Perhaps it could generate liquidity by selling interests in its subsidiaries or other assets.
Perhaps it could receive necessary capital infusions from the government. Perhaps it could
raise resources via other sources or forms of financing which may present better/more
amenable/pose lesser risks to interruption of its business than publicly traded securities issued
and traded in international capital markets.
258. For example, some of the Notes issued by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico’s
state owned oil company, incorporate CACs reminiscent of those found in instruments issued
by sovereign issuers. Se Petróleos Mexicanos, Final Prospectus, Petróleos Mexicanos,
Exchange
Offer,
PEMEX
50
(Feb.
22,
2018),
http://www.pemex.com/ri/reguladores/Documents/Rule%20424(b)(3),%20filed%20Feb22,
%202018.pdf (listing the securities offerings of Petroleos Mexicanos)).
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owners when issuing debt. However, the worst moment to learn of one’s
inability to access debtor relief would be, undeniably, in circumstances in
which it is most needed.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: PDVSA & Venezuela Long Term Rating History
Figure 4: PDVSA Long Term Rating History, Moody’s259

Figure 5: Venezuela Long Term Rating History, Moody’s260

259. Moody’s Investors Service, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.: Rating.
260. Moody’s Investors Service, Venezuela, Government of: Ratings

926

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV

Appendix 2: PDVSA & Venezuela Bond Pricing
Figure 6: PDVSA Bond Pricing, October 6, 2015—March 6, 2018261

Figure 7: Venezuela Bond Pricing, October 6 2015—March 6, 2018262

261. Bloomberg Finance L.P., “Bond price graph for PDVSA.”
262. Bloomberg Finance L.P., “Bond price graph for Venezuela.”
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Appendix 3: PDVSA & Venezuela Bond Yields (Mid Price
YTM)
Figure 8: PDVSA Bond Yields (Mid Price YTM), October 6, 2015—
March 6, 2018263

Figure 9: Venezuela Bond Yields (Mid Price YTM), October 6, 2015—
March 6, 2018264

263. Bloomberg Finance L.P., “Bond yield (Mid price YTM) graph for PDVSA.”
264. Bloomberg Finance L.P., “Bond yield (Mid price YTM) graph for Venezuela.”
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Appendix 4: PDVSA’s Financial Debt and Other Liabilities
Table 4: PDVSA’s Financial Debt and Other Liabilities
Liabilities

Currency

Outstanding
US$ million

Information
Source

USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD

Petrolera Cerro Negro, S.A. - 7.900% Guaranteed Bonds due 06/30/20
$2,206m Credit Facility, Credit Suisse
PDVSA Petróleo, S.A. & Subsidiaries Total Debt

USD
USD

1
1,262
1,263

7.900% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
LIBOR+7.90% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

Petrosanfelix, S.A. - 8.370% Guaranteed Bonds due 12/31/22
Petrowarao, S.A. - $420m Credit Facility, Perenco Holdings
Petrocedeño, S.A. - $60m Credit Facility, Novo Banco
Petrozamora, S.A. - $1,000m Prepayment Facility, GPB Energy Services
Petrolera Sinovensa, S.A. - $4,015m Credit Facility, CDBC
Petroboscán, S.A. - $2,000m Credit Facility, Chevron
Petroquiriquire, S.A. - $1,200m Credit Facility, Repsol
Petrodelta, S.A. - $20m Unsecured Loan, CT Energia Holding Ltd
Corp. Venezolana del Petróleo, S.A. & Subsidiaries Total Debt

USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
VEF

1
9
20
143
1,256
626
909
6
2,970

8.22%-8.37%
LIBOR+4.50%
1.320%
LIBOR+6.9%
LIBOR+5.8%
LIBOR+4.5%

Panavenflot Corp - ¥20,000m Credit Facility, JBIC
$111m Secured Loan, Deutsche Bank
Capital Leases of PDV Marina
PDV Marina, S.A. & Subsidiaries Total Debt

YEN
USD
USD

99
19
121
239

CIRR 1.77% floor + 3.12% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
7.000% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

Capital Leases of Refinería Isla Curazao
Refinería Isla (Curazao), S.A. & Subsidiaries Total Debt
Total Subsidiary Level Debt

USD

68
68
8,867

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

Liabilities

USD

USD
USD

Currency

Total Subsidiary Level Debt
$1,226m Secured Loan, JBIC
$950m Secured Loan, JBIC
8.500% Senior Secured Notes due 10/27/20
Capital Leases of Petroleos de Venezuela SA
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Secured Liabilities
$15m Investment Certificate, Banco de Venezuela
$270m Investment Certificate, BANDES
$3m Investment Certificate, Banco de Venezuela
$7m Investment Certificate, Banco del Tesoro, Banco Universal
$3m Investment Certificate, FOGADE
$92m Investment Certificate, BANDES
$44m Investment Certificate, Banco de Venezuela
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Investment Certificates
$257m Credit Note, General Electric
$100m Credit Note, CPVEN
$100m Credit Note, Petroalianza
$118m Credit Note, Maritime Contractors
$120m Credit Note, Weatherford
$200m Credit Note, Halliburton
$66m Credit Note, ESVENCA
$27m Credit Note, PROAMSA
$190m Credit Note, Elecnor
$37m Credit Note, Servicios Picardi
$409m Credit Notes, Other Suppliers
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Credit Notes
Bs 1,587m Credit Facility, Banco de Venezuela
Bs 635m Credit Facility, Banco del Tesoro
$500m Credit Facility, CDBC
$638m Credit Facility, BNDES
$ 300m Credit Facility, Banco San Juan
$ 230m Credit Facility, General Electric
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Credit Facilities
$50m Unsec. Loan, BANDES
$62m Unsec. Loan, Deutsche Bank
$1m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela(1)
$1m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela(2)
$7m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela
$4m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela(1)
$3m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela
$1m Unsec. Loan, National Public Banks
$4m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela(2)
$5m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela
$4m Unsec. Loan, Banco de Venezuela(3)
$29m Unsec. Loan, National Public Banks
$10m Unsec. Loan, BANDES
$600m Unsec. Loan, CDBC
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Loans
9.100% Unsecured Bonds due 07/14/17
5.375% Unsecured Bonds due 04/12/27
5.500% Unsecured Bonds due 04/12/37
9.000% Unsecured Bonds due 11/17/21
6.000% Unsecured Bonds due 10/28/22
12.750% Unsecured Bonds due 02/17/22
6.000% Unsecured Bonds due 05/16/24
6.000% Unsecured Bonds due 11/15/26
9.750% Unsecured Bonds due 05/17/35
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Bonds
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Unsecured Debt
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Total Debt
PDVSA & Subsidiaries Total Debt, excluding entities available for sale

225
50
635
650
50
25
30
507
2,172
3
3
2,175
652
1,500
2,152
4,327

Interest
Rate

$450m Secured A/R Facility
$900m Secured Revolving Credit Facility
$650m Senior Secured Term Loan B
6.250% Senior Secured Notes due 08/15/22
4.880% Industrial tax exempt bond due 05/01/25
8.000% Industrial tax exempt bond due 04/01/28
8.000% Industrial tax exempt bond due 06/01/32
Capital Leases of CITGO Petroleum Corp.
CITGO Petroleum Corp Secured Debt
6.000% Industrial tax exempt bond due 07/01/23
CITGO Petroleum Corp Unsecured Debt
CITGO Petroleum Corp. Total Debt
$1,300m Senior Secured Term Loan B
10.750% Senior Secured Notes due 02/15/20
CITGO Holding Inc. Secured Debt
CITGO Holding Inc. & Subsidiaries Total Debt

Outstanding
US$ million

CP + 1.50%
Base Rate 3.5% + 1.75%
LIBOR 1.00% floor + 3.50%
6.250%
4.880%
8.000%
8.000%

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

6.000% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

LIBOR 1.00% floor + 8.50% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
10.750% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Debt Balance
12.000% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

Interest
Rate

Information
Source

8,867
USD
USD
USD
USD
VEF
USD
VEF
VEF
VEF
USD
VEF
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
VEF
VEF
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
VEF
USD
USD
VEF
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD
USD

1,226
950
2,526
1
4,703
15
270
3
7
3
92
44
434
231
100
100
118
120
200
66
27
190
37
409
1,597
2
1
177
241
117
37
575
50
62
1
1
7
4
3
1
4
5
4
29
10
600
781
2
3,000
1,500
2,394
3,000
3,000
5,000
4,500
3,000
25,396
28,783
33,486
42,353

LIBOR + 0.50%-6.50% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
LIBOR + 1.50%-8.75% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
8.500% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
14.000%
6.000%
8.000%
8.000%
9.500%
6.000%
18.000%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
6.500%
12.500%
9.500%
LIBOR + 4.55%
LIBOR + 2.20%
6.25%–7.5%
7.500%

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

LIBOR + 5.00%
LIBOR + 7.20%
12.500%
12.500%
12.000%
12.500%
12.500%
12.000%
12.500%
12.000%
12.500%
14.000%

PDVSA 2016 Financial Debt Balance
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Debt Balance
LIBOR + 6.25% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
9.100%
5.375%
5.500%
9.000%
6.000%
12.750%
6.000%
6.000%
9.750%

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
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Liabilities

Currency

PDVSA & Subsidiaries Total Debt, excluding entities available for sale

Outstanding
US$ million

929

Interest
Rate

Information
Source

42,353

Trocana World Inc - $28m Secured Loan, BANDES
Tovase Development Corp - $31m Secured Loan, BANDES
Fluvialba - $7m Unsecured Loan, Banco Credicorp
PDV Caribe - $24m Unsecured Loan, BANDES
Capital Leases of PDVSA América
PDVSA América, S.A. & Subsidiaries, Total Debt

USD
USD
ARS
USD
USD

28
31
7
16
1
83

€136m Credit Facility, Novo Banco
Total PDVSA Naval S.A. & subsidiaries
Entities available for sale, Total Debt
PDVSA & Subsidiaries Total Debt, including entities available for sale

EUR

10
10
93
42,446

EURIBOR + 3.8% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

$8,000m Promissory Notes, BCV
$391m Accounts Payable, Republic of Venezuela
$3,723m Promissory Notes, PDVSA Pension Funds
$3,843m Accounts Payable, Other related parties
Accounts Payable to Related Entities
$1,500m Sec. Advance received from customers, Rosneft
$500m Sec. Advance received from customers, Rosneft
$4,000m Unsec. Advance received from customers, Rosneft
$500m Unsec. Advance received from customers, Rosneft
Advances received from customers, Rosneft
$2,007m Dividends payable to non-controlling interests
$2,662m Notes & Accrued Payables to contractors
$397m Interest payable
PDVSA Pension & Other benefits (net of CITGO Petroleum)
PDVSA Accrued Payables and Other Liabilities

NA
NA
NA
NA

8,000
391
3,723
3,843
15,957
1,500
500
4,362
500
6,862
2,007
2,662
397
3,092
30,977

3.500% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
9.500% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

CITGO Pension & Other benefits
CITGO Other Liabilities
PDVSA & Subsidiaries Other Liabilities
PDVSA Total Debt & Other Liabilities

USD
USD
USD
USD
NA
NA
NA
NA

USD

720
720
31,697
74,143

LIBOR + 1.00%
LIBOR + 1.00%
26.000%
6.000%

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
LIBOR + 4.00% PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements
PDVSA 2016 Exchange Offering Circular
PDVSA 2016 Financial Statements

CITGO Petroleum 2016 Financial Statements
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Appendix 5: PDVSA’s Debt Collateral and Guarantees
Table 2: PDVSA’s Financial Debt with Collateral Packages and/or Group
Guarantees265
I ssuer

Obligation
$1,226m Secured Loan, JBI C
$950m Secured Loan, JBI C
$1,500m Sec. Advancereceived from customers, Rosneft
$500m Sec. Advancereceived from customers, Rosneft
8.500% Senior Secured Notes due10/ 27/ 20

5.375% Unsecured Bonds due04/ 12/ 27
5.500% Unsecured Bonds due04/ 12/ 37
Petróleos de
9.000% Unsecured Bonds due11/ 17/ 21
VenezuelaS.A.
6.000% Unsecured Bonds due10/ 28/ 22

Secured?
ü
ü
ü

NA

NA

ü

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

Senior secured Obligation of theGuarantor

ü

Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Guarantor
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Guarantor
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Guarantor
Unsecured, senior obligations of the
Guarantor

û
û
û

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.
PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

6.000% Unsecured Bonds due05/ 16/ 24

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

6.000% Unsecured Bonds due11/ 15/ 26

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

9.750% Unsecured Bonds due05/ 17/ 35

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

Collateral, if known
NA
NA
49.9% of thecapital stock of CI TGO Holding I nc.
Collateral, call options over theshares of certain Empresas
Mixtas
First-priority lien on 50.1% of thecapital stock of CI TGO
Holding. I nc

û
û
û
û
û
Secured by CI TGO Petroleum Corp.'s interests in its Lake
Charles, Louisiana, Corpus Christi and Lemont, I llinois
refineries, tradeaccounts receivablethat havenot been used as
guaranteefor other credit facilities and its inventories
Secured by CI TGO Petroleum Corp.'s interests in its Lake
Charles, Louisiana, Corpus Christi and Lemont, I llinois
refineries, tradeaccounts receivablethat havenot been used as
guaranteefor other credit facilities and its inventories
Secured by TradeAccounts Receivableof CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.
Secured by CI TGO Petroleum Corp.'s interests in its Lake
Charles, Louisiana, Corpus Christi and Lemont, I llinois
refineries, tradeaccounts receivablethat havenot been used as
guaranteefor other credit facilities and its inventories

$650m Senior Secured Term Loan B

CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.'s material
subsidiaries

Senior obligations of theGuarantors

ü

$900m Secured Revolving Credit Facility

CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.'s material
subsidiaries

Senior obligations of theGuarantors

ü

NA

NA

ü

CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.'s material
subsidiaries

Senior obligations of theGuarantors

ü

4.880% I ndustrial tax exempt bond due05/ 01/ 25

NA

NA

ü

Secured on an equitablebasis by thesamecollateral that secures
theCI TGO Senior Secured Credit Facility, except that lenders
under CI TGO’s senior secured rcredit facility will havepriority
to proceeds of certain inventory comprising thecollateral.

8.000% I ndustrial tax exempt bond due04/ 01/ 28

NA

NA

ü

Secured on an equitablebasis by thesamecollateral that secures
theCI TGO Senior Secured Credit Facility, except that lenders
under CI TGO’s senior secured rcredit facility will havepriority
to proceeds of certain inventory comprising thecollateral.

8.000% I ndustrial tax exempt bond due06/ 01/ 32

NA

NA

ü

Secured on an equitablebasis by thesamecollateral that secures
theCI TGO Senior Secured Credit Facility, except that lenders
under CI TGO’s senior secured rcredit facility will havepriority
to proceeds of certain inventory comprising thecollateral.

$1,300m Senior Secured Term Loan B

CI TGO Holding I nc.'s
direct subsidiaries other
than CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.

NA

ü

Secured by 100% of CI TGO Petroleum Corp.'s capital stock
and 100% of thelimited liability company interests in CI TGO
Holding's and other direct subsidiaries, CI TGO Holding
Terminals, Southwest PipelineHolding and Midwest Pipeline
Holding

10.750% Senior Secured Notes due02/ 15/ 20

CI TGO Holding I nc.'s
direct subsidiaries other
than CI TGO Petroleum
Corp.

NA

ü

Secured on aratablebasis by thesamecollateral that secures the
CI TGO Holding I nc.'s Senior Secured Term Loan B

6.250% Senior Secured Notes due08/ 15/ 22
CI TGO
Petroleum
Corp.

CI TGO
Holding I nc.

Petrolera
SinovensaS.A.

GuaranteeNote
NA
NA
NA

PDVSA Petróleo S.A.
PDVSA Petróleo S.A.
PDVSA Petróleo S.A.

12.750% Unsecured Bonds due02/ 17/ 22

$450m Secured A/ R Facility

PDVSA
Petróleo S.A.

Guarantor
NA
NA
NA

$2,206m Credit Facility, Credit Suisse

PetroleraSinovensa, S.A. - $4,015m Credit Facility, CDBC

Petróleos deVenezuela PDVSA Petróleo's obligations under thecredit
S.A.
agreement areguaranteed by PDVSA

û

Petróleos deVenezuela
S.A.

PDVSA has apayment guaranteeobligation
of 60% of Petrosinovensa's payment
obligations under thefacility agreement

û

û

Petroboscán
S.A.

Petroboscán, S.A. - $2,000m Credit Facility, Chevron

Petróleos deVenezuela
S.A.

PDVSA has apayment guaranteeof 60% of
Petroboscan, S.A.'s payment obligations
under thefacility agreement. Such guarantee
can increaseto 100% of theborrower's
payment obligations under certain
circumstances.

PDV Marina
S.A.

$111m Secured Loan, DeutscheBank

NA

NA

ü

NA

TrocanaWorld
I nc. - Secured
Loan

TrocanaWorld I nc- $28m Secured Loan, BANDES

NA

NA

ü

NA

Tovase
Development
Corp.

TovaseDevelopment Corp - $31m Secured Loan, BANDES

NA

NA

ü

NA

265. Source: Bloomberg; PDVSA 2016 Debt Balance Report; PDVSA 2016 Exchange
Offering Circular
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Appendix 6: Doing Business, Resolving Insolvency Rankings
Figure 10: Resolving Insolvency
Ranking
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Figure 11: Strength of Insolvency
Framework (Max score = 16)
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Figure 13: Recovery Rate (Secured
Creditors)
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Figure 12: Length of Procedure
(Time, in years)
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